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The Death of the Voting Rights Act or
an Exercise in Geometry?-Shaw v. Reno
Provides More Questions Than Answers
Minority voting rights jurisprudence, like other Fourteenth Amendment juris-
prudence, is torn between two competing moral imperatives: the need to protect
the weak against the strong and the few against the many, and the claim that,
absent extraordinary circumstances, and perhaps not even then, the law must be
color-blind.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The dilemma over minority voting rights has provided many commen-
tators and social scientists with a fertile source of discussion,' and the
debate recently reached our nation's highest court in the case of Shaw v.
Reno.3 In Shaw, the Supreme Court decided whether a state may inten-
tionally use race as a predominant factor in creating a congressional vot-
ing district.4 The plaintiffs in Shaw alleged that the unusual shape of
North Carolina's twelfth congressional district constituted a deliberate
attempt to segregate voters on the basis of race in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' The state contended
that the district complied with the Voting Rights Act and lacked the nec-
essary invidious intent of an Equal Protection violation.' At stake was
legislation that enabled the voters of North Carolina to elect its first Afri-
1. Bernard Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right If He Had Said:
"When It Comes to Redistricting, Race Isn't Everything, It's the Only Thing?", 14
CARDOZO L REV. 1237, 1275 (1993).
2. See generally Katheryn Abrams, 'Raising Politics Up': Minority Political Par-
ticipation and Section 2 of The Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L REv. 449 (1988);
ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT?.: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING
RIGHTS (1987); Alan Howard & Bruce Howard, The Dilemma of the Voting Rights
Act-Recognizing the Emerging Political Equality Norm, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1615
(1983).
3. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
4. See infra notes 23-48 and accompanying text.
5. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824.
6. Supplemental Brief for Appellee at 5, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993)
(No. 92-357).
can-American representative to Congress since the Civil War.7 In a deci-
sion that may eventually change the way states create congressional
districts, a sharply divided Supreme Court rejected North Carolina's "af-
firmative" districting plan in order to further its goal of a "colorblind
electoral process."' In recognizing a new cause of action for voters un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that a state reapportion-
ment plan that is "so irrational on its face that it can be understood only
as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of
their race" must be narrowly tailored to satisfy a compelling state inter-
est.'0
Writing for a five justice majority, Justice O'Connor focused on the
bizarre shape of the newly formed twelfth district" and the social evils
of allegedly benign racial classifications.'2 The twelfth district's unusual
shape directly resulted from the General Assembly's attempt to comply
with the Voting Rights Act.'3 The Act bars election schemes that result
in the abridgement of the right to vote on the basis of race. 4 The deci-
7. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2843 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
8. Id. The Court did not hold that the conscious use of race in creating North
Carolina's new 12th congressional district was per se unconstitutional. Rather, the
Court held that the intentional use of race subjected the district to strict scrutiny. Id.
at 2832. However, the Court's interpretation of "narrowly tailored" and its conclusion
that compliance with the Voting Rights Act is insufficient justification to qualify as a
"compelling state interest" effectively precludes its use.
9. Id. at 2824. The expression that the Constitution is "colorblind" originated in
Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
10. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832. Although the use of strict scrutiny applies to other
forms of racial classifications, the Court previously distinguished voting practices from
non-voting practices. See id. at 2845 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Until today, the Court
has analyzed equal protection claims involving race in electoral districting differently
from equal protection claims involving other forms of governmental conduct.").
11. The Court described North Carolina's 12th district as "snake-like." Id. at 2821.
Another commentator stated that the district "resembles a very slender worm with
unsightly bulges." Grofman, supra note 1, at 1257. The Court used the district's un-
usual shape to distinguish the case from an earlier case with almost identical facts.
See infra notes 294-97 and accompanying text
12. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827. Justice O'Connor identified three evils of allegedly
benign racial classifications. First, "when a district obviously is created solely to ef-
fectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected officials are
more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members
of that group, rather than their constituency as a whole." d. Second, benign racial
classifications reinforce "the perception that members of the same racial group-
regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which they
live-think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candi-
dates at the polls." Id. Finally, the mgjority states that "by perpetuating such notions,
a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting that
majority-minority districting is sometimes said to counteract." Id.
13. Id. at 2819.
14. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 45 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988). Section 5 of the Act
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sion in Shaw suddenly raises serious questions regarding the viability of
the Act as well as a state's ability to foster minority representation
through affirmative districting. 5 By subjecting North Carolina's majority-
minority district to strict scrutiny, and by characterizing it as a possible
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court may have foreclosed
the intentional creation of majority-minority "safe" districts."6
This Note examines the Supreme Court's decision in Shaw v. Reno in
light of previous Equal Protection Clause decisions as well as previous
minority voting rights decisions.'7 Section II details the facts of Shaw
prohibits states such as North Carolina, previously found to have abridged minority
voting rights, from instituting changes in their voting practices that would "lead to a
retrogression" in the voting strength of racial minorities. Beer v. United States, 425
U.S. 130, 141 (1976). Since North Carolina's initial redistricting failed to satisfy the
non-retrogression principle in the United States Attorney General's Opinion, the North
Carolina General Assembly created a majority-minority district with a 57% minority
population at the expense of traditional districting principles. See infra notes 23-38
and accompanying text.
15. The Court stated that "the Equal Protection Clause demands strict scrutiny of
all racial classifications." Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2830.
16. A "safe" district refers to a district drawn to include a supermajority of mi-
nority voters. See Howard & Howard, supra note 2, at 1615 ("A safe district is a
district in which a large majority of the residents shares a certain politically signifi-
cant characteristic or interest, thereby making it likely that the district will elect a
representative with the same characteristic or interest"). The benchmark for a
supermajority according to many courts is a 65% minority population. See Alexander
A. Yanos, Note, Reconciling the Right to Vote with the Voting Rights Act, 92 COLUM.
L. REV. 1810, 1831 (1992) ("Courts and the Department of Justice have agreed in
most cases that sixty-five percent of the district's voting population constitutes [a
safe] majority."). But see Jack Quinn et al., Congressional Redistricting in the 1990s:
The Impact of the 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act, 1 GEO. MASON U. CIV.
RTs. L.J. 207, 241 (1990) (stating that the 65% figure is not a requirement, as has
been misconstrued by "widespread belief"). The purpose of a safe district is to pro-
vide a minority group with the ability to control the results of an election. See
Howard M. Shapiro, Note, Geometry and Geography: Racial Gerrymandering and the
Voting Rights Act, 94 YALE L.J. 189, 200-01 (1984). Safe districts frequently remedy
situations where discrimination stunts minority participation in the political process.
The arguments articulated by the majority in Shaw logically would apply to the
creation of a "safe district." Justice O'Connor wrote that a "reapportionment plan that
includes in one district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are other-
wise widely separated by geographical and political boundaries, and who may have
little in common with one another but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfort-
able resemblance to political apartheid." Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827. However, Justice
O'Connor explicitly reserved the question of whether safe districts are always subject
to strict scrutiny. Id. at 2828.
17. Id. at 2816.
leading up to the decision.'" Section III examines the history of both
minority voting legislation and cases involving racial classifications for
activities other than voting.'" Section IV analyzes Shaw's majority opin-
ion as well as the four dissenting opinions.' ° Section V discusses the po-
tential impact of the decision on future redistricting plans as well as
current districts that may be in violation of the Court's holding.2' Sec-
tion VI concludes that while North Carolina's twelfth district should have
been struck down as an improper use of political power to effectuate
political protectionism, a compactness standard for congressional dis-
tricts would achieve the same goals as the majority set out in Shaw and
could eliminate the inevitable confusion surrounding the use of race in
creating future districts.' Furthermore, the Court's failure to recognize
the need for racial classifications in extraordinary circumstances to com-
bat longstanding discrimination carries the ideal of the "colorblind Con-
stitution" to a naive and harmful conclusion.
II. FACTS OF THE CASE
Prior to the 1990 redistricting, only one of North Carolina's eleven
congressional districts contained an African-American majority of voting
age citizens.' Due to an increase in the general population as reflected
in the 1990 Census, North Carolina became eligible for an additional seat
in the United States House of Representatives.' The additional seat
forced the state to redraw its eleven congressional districts to create a
twelfth.' Since North Carolina was "covered" under section five of the
Voting Rights Act," the United States Attorney General required the
State to submit its redistricting plan for preclearance.27
The North Carolina General Assembly approved a redistricting plan
that created a twelfth district and submitted it to the Attorney General.'
The plan left intact the existing majority-minority district (district one),
18. See infra notes 23-48 and accompanying text.
19. See inmra notes 49-196 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 197-350 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 352-74 and accompanying text.
22. See i(fra notes 375-89 and accompanying text.
23. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. C. 2816, 2820 (1993). The voting population of North
Carolina is approximately 78% white, 2096 black, 1% Native American and 1% Asian.
Id.
24. Id. at 2819.
25. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 463 (E.D.N.C. 1992).
26. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2820. Those states or counties "covered" under § 5 must
submit changes in their voting practices to the Attorney General for approval before
implementing any new plan. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1993).
27. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2820.
28, Id.
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but the new twelfth district contained a white majority.' The Attorney
General, acting within the power of section five of the Act, rejected the
new plan because it failed to give appropriate attention to increasing the
minority voting strength in the southeastern region of the state.' The
Attorney General underscored the importance of creating a second ma-
jority-minority district in North Carolina."
In response to the Attorney General's rejection of the original redis-
tricting plan, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted another plan,
the redistricting legislation at issue in Shaw.' This time, the General
Assembly drew the twelfth district in such a manner that it possessed a
majority of African American citizens, giving North Carolina its second
majority-minority district.' However, because it failed to concentrate
the African-American population into a compact geographic area, the
district took on a contorted and bizarre shape.' Located along a thin
strip of land, some 160 miles long, the new district snaked diagonally
across North Carolina from Durham to Gastonia.' At times, the district
was no wider than the local interstate highway.' The unusual configura-
tion of the twelfth district divided many precincts, counties and towns in
North Carolina among two or even three congressional districts. 7 Fur-
thermore, the twelfth district could not even be considered contiguous
since at one point another district actually bisected it.'
The first attack on the new district unsuccessfully alleged that the
twelfth district represented an unconstitutional political gerrymander.'
After a federal district court denied this challenge, ° five plaintiffs initiat-
29. Id. This would have given whites a majority in 11 of the 12 congressional
districts, or 92%, while African-Americans formed the majority in only 1 of 12 dis-
tricts, or 8%. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. See also State Appellee's Brief at 9, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993)
(No. 92-357).
32. Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392, 394 (W.D.N.C.), affd, 113 S. Ct. 30 (1992).
33. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2820. The 12th district had an African-American population
of 57%. See State Appellees' Brief at 24a, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (No.
92-357).
34. T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race And Redistricting: Drawing
Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L REV. 588, 591 (1993).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C.), affd, 113 S. Ct. 30 (1992).
40. Id. at 399.
ed the suit in Shaw. The plaintiffs resided in the area affected by the
new district.4 Prior to the redistricting, the plaintiffs were registered
voters in the second district.42 The new plan placed two in the twelfth
district and three in the second.' The plaintiffs alleged that North
Carolina's revised plan violated the Fourteenth Amendment by deliberate-
ly creating two districts, each with a majority of black voters." The plan
disregarded other traditional districting principles such as compactness,
contiguousness, geographical boundaries and political subdivisions.4 Re-
lying on the Supreme Court's ruling in United Jewish Organizations v.
Carey,46 a divided three-judge district court dismissed the plaintiffs'
complaint.47 The United States Supreme Court subsequently granted cer-
tiorari.
48
III. BACKGROUND
The confrontation in Shaw arises out of the conflict between two im-
portant concepts in American jurisprudence: the right to vote and the
dangers associated with governmental classifications based on race. To
evaluate the Court's decision in the context of these two concepts, the
background section has been divided into two subsections. The first sub-
section explores the Court's historic decisions concerning minority vot-
ing legislation from the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to cas-
es interpreting the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act.4 The sec-
ond subsection reviews the Court's decisions on the application of the
Equal Protection Clause to non-voting matters where states have classi-
fied citizens on the basis of race.w
A. History of Minority Voting
States have historically abridged minority voting rights in several ways.
First, states directly prevented minorities from participating in the voting
41. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2821 (1993).
42. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1992), rev'd, Shaw v. Reno, 113
S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
43. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2821.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 430 U.S. 144 (1977). See i7fra notes 294-97 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion on the lower court and the dissent's reliance on United Jewish Organiza-
tions.
47. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 470-73 (E.D.N.C. 1992).
48. Shaw v. Barr, 113 S. Ct. 653 (1992).
49. See infra notes 51-156 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 157-96 and accompanying text.
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process by way of literacy tests, poll taxes and grandfather clauses."
States enacted these measures to deny suffrage to minorities while leav-
ing the white vote predominantly unaffected.2 Secondly, states pre-
vented minorities from exercising political power by targeting the effec-
tiveness of the minority vote. The Court referred to state practices that
purposely reduced minority voting strength through apparently neutral
legislation as "vote dilution." '
1. Early Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment Decisions
The origin of minority voting rights can be traced to two constitutional
amendments.' After the Civil War, Congress passed the Fourteenth
Amendment which conferred citizenship on all persons born or natural-
ized in the United States.' In addition, the amendment reduced a state's
representation in Congress to the extent that the state denied "to any of
its male inhabitants... the right to vote."' Congress' intent was to co-
erce the southern states into extending suffrage to blacks by threatening
a reduction in their Congressional representation." The amendment did
51. See infra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
52. See Emma Coleman Jordan, Taking Voting Rights Seriously: Rediscovering The
Fifteenth Amendment, 64 NEB. L REV. 389, 402 (1985) (describing the states' enact-
ments of grandfather clauses, vote fraud, understand and explain tests, and white
primaries as attempts to disenfranchise black voters); see also South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 303 (1966) (discussing tests "specifically designed to pre-
vent negroes from voting while permitting white persons to vote").
53. See Quinn et al., supra note 16, at 241. Vote dilution can take many forms.
The three most common include packing, cracking, and stacking:
(i) "packing" refers to placing more minority members in a district than are
necessary to elect a representative of their choice, thereby wasting those ex-
cess votes; (ii) "cracking" or (splitting) is the division of a minority constitu-
ency among two or more districts so that its ability to elect a representative
in any district is impaired; and (ii) "stacking" refers to the practice of plac-
ing a minority community in a large multi-member district so that the minori-
ty voters, who would be able to elect a representative in a single-member
district, are submerged within the larger pool .of majority voters.
Id. at 209.
54. Robert Bryson Carter, Mere Voting: Presley v. Etowah County Commission
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 71 N.C. L. REv. 569, 569 (1993) (noting that the
13th, 14th and 15th Amendments are the origin of minority voting rights).
55. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
56. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
57. See Carter, supra note 54, at 569.
not, however, explicitly give blacks the right to vote.' Instead, it gave
states the option of giving blacks suffrage or having their power in Con-
gress reduced.' The amendment's omission of an unqualified voting
right for blacks was a necessary compromise to ensure its passage in
Congress.'
In 1870, black suffrage gained explicit constitutional protection with
the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment.' The amendment signaled an
important turning point in increasing black participation in the political
process.' White-dondnated state legislatures, however, responded by
creating impediments designed to undermine black voting efforts.' The
Supreme Court compounded the problem by giving the Fifteenth
Amendment a narrow interpretation, as illustrated in the 1876 case of
United States v. Reese.'4 In Reese, the federal government brought
charges against Kentucky election inspectors who refused to count the
vote of a black citizen.' The Supreme Court refused to uphold the in-
dictments on the basis that Congress neglected to enact a specific statu-
tory scheme to implement the Fifteenth Amendment." More damaging,
however, was the Court's pronouncement that "[t]he Fifteenth Amend-
ment does not confer the right of suffrage upon anyone." ' Instead, the
Court found that the Fifteenth Amendment only protects citizens from a
denial of their right to vote when such a denial can be shown to a rea-
sonable certainty to be racially motivated.' After Reese, southern states
58. Id. at 569.
59. See id. ("Although [the Fourteenth Amendment] punished states' denial of black
suffrage, it implicitly affirmed the right to such a denial as long as states were will-
ing to pay the price in representation."); see also Emma C. Jordan, The Future of the
F0?eenth Amendment, 28 How. LJ. 541, 547 (1985) (stating that prior to the ratifica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, three-fourths of the states would have barred
black citizens from voting).
60. Carter, supra note 54, at 570.
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. Section 1 reads: -The right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State
on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." Id. § 1.
62. See Carter, supra note 54, at 572 (explaining that after passage of the amend-
ment, about two-thirds of eligible black males casted ballots in the South).
63. Such impediments included poll taxes, literary tests and property requirements.
For example, at the 1895 South Carolina Constitutional Convention, Senator Ben
Tillman commented on a proposed literacy test: "[T]he only thing we can do as patri-
ots and as statesmen is to take from (the 'ignorant blacks') every ballot that we can
under the laws of our national government." South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301, 310-11 n.9 (1966) (citations omitted).
64. 92 U.S. 214 (1876).
65. Id. at 224 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 221 ("Congress has not as yet provided by appropriate legislation for the
punishment of the offense charged in the indictment.").
67. Id. at 217.
68. Id.
[Vol. 22: 727, 1995] Death of the Voting Rights Act
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
initiated a campaign to disenfranchise black voters using devices such as
literacy tests, gerrymandering, intimidation and voting fraud.' The re-
treat from the ideals of the post-civil war era continued for the remain-
der of the nineteenth century and eradicated practically all of the prog-
ress achieved by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.0
2. Early Twentieth Century Decisions
After the turn of the century, the Supreme Court turned its attention
toward the state-created impediments which effectively disenfranchised
black voters.7 In 1915, the Court in Guinn v. United States'm consid-
ered an amendment to the Oklahoma Constitution which required voters
to pass a literacy test as a prerequisite to voting.'m The amendment also
included a provision exempting all citizens eligible to vote on January 1,
1866, and all lineal descendants of those persons from the examination
requirement.74 The Court held that this "grandfather clause" comprised
an unconstitutional attempt to circumvent the Fifteenth Amendment.7'
The same day, the Court in Myers v. Anderson also held a similar
Maryland statute to be unconstitutional." The Maryland statute defined
three categories under which a citizen could qualify to vote.' The third
category required the citizen either to have been eligible to vote prior to
January 1, 1868, or be a descendent of a citizen eligible to vote on that
69. See Carter, supra note 54, at 571.
70. Id.
71. See Adam J. Chill, The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments with Respect to
the Voting Franchise: A Constitutional Quandary, 25 COLUM. J.L & SOC. PROBS. 645,
650. See generally Jordan, supra note 52.
72.. 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
73. Id. at 357 ("No person shall be registered as an elector of this State or be al-
lowed to vote in any election herein, unless he be able to read and write any section
of the constitution of the State of Oklahoma.').
74. Id. at 356.
75. Id. at 365. The Court further stated:
[Tihe provision, recurring to the conditions existing before the Fifteenth
Amendment was adopted and the continuance of which the Fifteenth Amend-
ment prohibited, proposed by in substance and effect lifting those conditions
over to a period of time after the Amendment, to make them the basis of
the right to suffrage conferred in direct and positive disregard of the Fif-
teenth Amendment.
Id.
76. Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915).
77. Id. at 377.
date.'8 In finding these state actions unconstitutional, the Court charac-
terized both the Oklahoma and the Maryland grandfather clauses as im-
permissible attempts to restore voting conditions as they existed prior to
the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment."
In later decisions, the Court continued to use the Fifteenth Amend-
ment to eliminate state-imposed barriers to minority suffrage. In 1939,
the Court in Lane v. Wilson' used the Fifteenth Amendment to strike
down the use of onerous voting registration requirements where white
voters were excluded by virtue of a "grandfather clause.""1 A frequently
quoted passage from the Court's decision evidenced its philosophy re-
garding the protection of minority voting rights: "The [Fifteenth] Amend-
ment nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimi-
nation."'
Similarly, in Smith v. Allwright,' the Court held that the Texas Dem-
ocratic Party violated the Fifteenth Amendment by permitting only
whites to vote in primary elections.' Allwright was the last in a series
of cases involving attempts by the Texas Democratic party to exclude
blacks from voting in election primaries.' As the Court began to expand
78. Id. at 368.
79. Id. at 380 ("[Tlhe [grandfather clause] is void because it amounts to a mere
denial of the operative effect of the Fifteenth Amendment, and . . . proceeds to re-
create and reestablish a condition which the Amendment prohibits.").
80. 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
81. Id. at 275-76. The statute which exempted white voters referred back to the
Oklahoma constitutional amendment struck down by the Court in Guinn. Id. at 276.
82. Id. at 275.
83. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
84. Id. at 661-62 ("[Tihe right to vote in such a primary . . . , like the right to
vote in a general election, is a right secured by the Constitution. By the terms of the
Fifteenth Amendment that right may not be abridged by any State on account of
race.") (citations omitted).
85. Initially, It was thought that primary elections were beyond the protection of
the Constitution. See, e.g., Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 539 (1927) (arguing that
"a nominating primary is purely a political matter" and outside the courts' powers).
However, in Nixon, the Court held a Texas statute excluding blacks from voting in
the primaries was unconstitutional. Id. at 540-41. Justice Holmes, writing for the ma-
jority, rejected the district court's finding that the case involved a non-justiciable
political question. Id. at 540. Texas responded by placing the power of membership
in the Democratic party in the hands of the party's executive committee, which once
again excluded blacks from the primaries. See Jordan, supra note 52, at 401 n.57.
Again, the Court found the exclusion unconstitutional in that the committee was held
to be an agent of the state. See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 88 (1932). When the
Democratic Party excluded blacks the following election, the exclusion was upheld on
the ground that it was no longer state action. See Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45,
53 (1935). The Court In AUwright overruled Grovey and recognized a state's responsi-
bility to eliminate discrimination at all stages of the political process. AUwight, 321
U.S. at 666. "[The place of the primary in the electdral- scheme makes clear that
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the concept of the right to vote beyond the mere pulling of a lever, it
subsequently struck down other "whites-only" primaries,' along with
impediments such as "understand and explain" requirements.17 The Fif-
teenth Amendment became a tool for remedying the injustices that had
taken place in the South, and the next barrier to fall was the racial gerry-
mander.
GomiUion v. Lightfoot' involved a challenge to state legislation which
appeared race-neutral on its face, but kept black citizens from exercising
their right to vote. In 1957, the Alabama legislature passed an act which
redrew the city limits of Tuskeegee from the shape of a square to that of
an irregular twenty-eight sided figure.'M As a result, nearly all of the
black citizens were removed from the city.' African-Americans who had
been citizens of Tuskeegee prior to the redistricting challenged the law,
claiming that the legislation illegally deprived them of the benefits of
their residency status.9' The Court held, under a Fifteenth Amendment
analysis, that the redistricting unconstitutionally deprived the black resi-
dents of their municipal vote.
In his concurrence, Justice Whittaker noted that he would have decid-
ed the case under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment . ' The remainder of the GomiUion Court showed reluctance to
apply the Fourteenth Amendment to this racial gerrymander.' This be-
state delegation to a party of the power to fix the qualifications of primary elections
is delegation of a state function that may make the party's action the action of the
State." Id. at 660.
86. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953)
87. See Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872, 878 (S.D. Ala.) (finding unconstitutional
a provision in the Alabama Constitutl6n that all voters be able to "understand and
explain" any article of the U.S. Constitution), affd, 336 U.S. 933 (1949).
88. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
89. Id. at 341.
90. Id. at 340.
91. Id. at 341.
92. Id. at 345 ("[T]he Fifteenth Amendment . . . forbids a State from passing any
law which deprives a citizen of his vote because of his race.").
93. Id. at 349 (Whittaker, J., concurring). Both Justice O'Connor's majority opinion
in Shaw, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2823 (1993), and Justice White's dissent, id.
at 2838-39 (White, J., dissenting), recognized the similarities between Shaw and
Gomillion. Both cases involved the use of racial gerrymanders. Although the cases
differ by their justifications, the action taken by Alabama and North Carolina legisla-
tures were exactly the same. Id. at 2816; Gomiflion, 364 U.S. at 339. However, one
gerrymander fenced out blacks and one fenced in blacks. The Shaw majority relied
on the 14th Amendment while the Gomilion Court decided the case on 15th Amend-
ment principles.
94. Id. at 342. Conversely, the court in Shaw invalidated the gerrymander on
havior can be attributed to the Court's decision in Colegrove v. Green.'
The Colegrove court held that issues of vote dilution were political ques-
tions' and therefore not justiciable.' Two years after the Court decid-
ed Gomillion, it overruled its decision in Colegrove and opened the door
to the modern era of voting rights jurisprudence.'
3. Baker, Reynolds, and The Voting Rights Act
In 1962, the Court faced another vote dilution case in Baker v. Carr.'
Baker concerned an equal protection claim alleging that the Tennessee's
districting plan created substantial disparities in the number of voters
per district."° The political question doctrine, as defined in Colegrove,
removed this type of case from the Court's jurisdiction.'' In Baker,
however, the Court held that reapportionment cases were justiciable
under the Equal Protection Clause since they affected an individual right
Fourteenth Amendment grounds. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2826.
95. 328 U.S. 549 (1946). Colegrove involved residents of an Illinois county who
challenged the population disparities of three Congressional voting districts. Id. at
550. The Court upheld the district court ruling that the plaintiffs cause of action was
not justiciable. Id. at 556. Writing for the majority, Justice Frankfurter stated:
We are of opinion that the appellants ask of this Court what is beyond its
competence to grant. This is one of those demands on judicial power which
cannot be met by verbal fencing about 'jurisdiction.' It must be resolved by
considerations on the basis of which this Court, from time to time, has re-
fused to intervene in controversies. It has refused to do so because due
regard for the effective working of our Government revealed this issue to be
of a peculiarly political nature and therefore not meet for judicial determina-
tion.
Id. at 552.
96. Political questions often involve disputes, typically between different branches
of government, that courts find inappropriate for judicial review. See Kevin R.
Puvalowsld, Immune Prom Review?: Threshold Issues in Section 1983 Challenges to
the Delegate Selection Procedures of National Political Parties, 62 FORDHAM L. REV.
409, 413-14 (1993). The standards by which political questions are judged were enun-
ciated by the Court in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See infra notes 99-105 and
accompanying text.
97. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 552. See Chill, supra note 71, at 651 n.32.
98. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 187-88.
101. The political question doctrine considered certain issues to be best decided by
the executive and legislative branches. Among these issues was the reapportionment
of state and federal districts, which the Court in Colegrove held to be a political
question and, therefore, not to be decided by the judicial branch. See Eric J. Stock-
man, Constitutional Gerrymandering: Fonfara v. Reapportionment Commission, 25
CONN. L REV. 1227, 1230 (1993) ("[Riedistricting, which inherently involved the inti-
mate workings of the political process, was to be left within the domain of the leg-
islative branches of the states.").
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and fell outside previously defined political question categories."2 Jus-
tice Brennan's opinion held. that "the mere fact that the suit seeks pro-
tection of a political right does not mean it presents a political ques-
tion."" The Baker decision "heralded a new era in constitutional juris-
prudence."" Furthermore, it has been referred to as one of the most
important Supreme Court decisions in the twentieth century because it
permitted the federal courts to oversee previously non-justiciable state
voting practices. 5
Soon after the Court decided Baker, it applied the Baker reasoning in a
similar vote dilution case. In Reynolds v. Sims,"2 the Court discussed
the concept of vote dilution 7 and brought the Fourteenth Amendment
into the arena of minority voting rights.'02 In Reynolds, the voters from
an Alabama county challenged the state's apportionment of congressional
districts due to wide disparities in the number of voters in some dis-
tricts. " The plaintiffs argued that a voter in District X with ten times as
many voters as District Y has only one-tenth the voting power of a voter
in District Y." The Court recognized this inequity and held that
districting schemes that created districts of disproportionate populations
violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."'
The Court stated:
How can one person be given twice or ten times the voting power of another
person in a state-wide election merely because he lives in a rural area... ? Once
the geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is designated, all
102. Baker, 369 U.S. at 226.
103. Id. at 209.
104. Stockman, supra note 101, at 1230.
105. See Yanos, supra note 16, at 1815 (stating that the importance of the Baker
decision was only equaled by Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1954)).
106. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
107. The term "vote dilution" was taken from the Reynolds decision, in which the
Court proclaimed that "the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilu-
tion of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the
free exercise of the franchise." Id. at 555.
108. See David L. Eades, Comment, Section 2 Of The Voting Rights Act: An Ap-
proach To The Results Test, 39 VAND. L. REV. 139, 142 (1986).
109. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 540.
110. Id. at 562-63.
111. Id. The Court recognized the imbalance as a contradiction to a democratic
government. Id. at 563-64. See also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) ("To
say that a vote is worth more in one district than in another would not only run
counter to our fundamental ideas of democratic government, it would cast aside the
principle of a House of Representatives elected 'by the People,' a principle tenacious-
ly fought for and established at the Constitutional Convention.").
who participate in the election are to have an equal vote .... This is required by
the Equal protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
The Court's holding that the Equal Protection Clause requires each vote
to weigh the same"3 is now referred to as the "one person, one vote"
doctrine."4 The doctrine applies easily to districting cases and clearly
embodies one of the most important principles in American voting
rights. 115
As a response to the civil rights movement of the 1960s, Congress
passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965. "' The Act increased minority po-
litical strength and facilitated the implementation of the amendments'
goals by eliminating the need for case-by-case litigation."7 Essentially a
codification of the Fifteenth Amendment, the Voting Rights Act prohibit-
ed state action that resulted in the denial or abridgment of the right to
vote on the basis of race."' In states where a violation of the Act has
occurred, a common procedural remedy is to create a "safe district."".
112. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 557-58 (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379
(1963)).
113. Id. at 568 ("The Equal Protection Clause demands no less than substantially
equal state legislative representation for all citizens, of all places as well as of all
races.").
114. See also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) ("[Tjhat Representatives be
chosen 'by the People of the several States' means that as nearly as is practicable,
one man's vote . . . is to be worth as much as another's.").
115. See Jim R. Karpiak, Voting Rights and the Role of the Federal Government:
The Rehnquist Court's Mixed Messages in Minority Vote Dilution Cases, 27 U.S.F. L.
REv. 627, 632 (1993) ("'One person, one vote' became a bedrock of voting rights ju-
risprudence.").
116. Pub. L No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437. Twenty-nine years after its enactment, the Vot-
ing Rights Act remains a prevalent and important body of legislation. More than one
third of the states are covered under § 5 of the Act, which requires the covered
jurisdictions to submit any changes in their electoral system to the Department of
Justice for pre-clearance. Id. at 483-84.
117. United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 156 (1977). Discussing the legislative
history of the Act, the Court stated: "It is also plain, however, that after 'repeatedly
try[ing] to cope with the problem by facilitating case-by-case litigation against voting
discrimination,' . . . Congress became dissatisfied with this approach...." Id. (quot-
ing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 313 (1966)).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988). Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or pro-
cedure shall be imposed or applied by any state or political subdivision in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of
the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of
the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title. ...
Id.
119. See Yanos, supra note 16, at 1822 ("Safe districting is the remedy most often
prescribed by courts in minority vote dilution cases where a violation of the Voting
Rights Act has been found."); see also Howard & Howard, supra note 2, at 1615-16
("Safe districts for minorities have been commonly created in jurisdictions seeking to
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The Act's capacity to increase the participation of black citizens in the
voting process proved to be an immediate success."n The Act employed
a "series of stringent measures, including the use of federal registrars
and election observers, the abolition of literacy tests nationwide and the
invalidation of restrictive registration policies generally."121 The increase
in black voter participation, however, was once again followed by state
legislative schemes developed to minimize the impact of the increase of
black votes. "n
The southern states, in addition to their attempts to circumvent the
Act, also attacked the Act directly on constitutional grounds. The Act
received its first constitutional challenge in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach,n in which South Carolina 24 argued that Congress had
exceeded its power and encroached on its rights under the Tenth
Amendment.'25 Katzenbach involved, inter alia, a challenge to section
five of the Act, its mechanism for enforcement.' Section five requires
counties or states "covered"'27 under the section to clear all new voting
regulations with the federal government before enacting them."u The
have their electoral schemes approved by the Justice Department and courts under
the relatively narrow § 5 of the Act").
120. See Pamela S. Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing: Single-Member Offices and the
Voting Rights Act, 77 VA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1991).
121. Id.
122. See id. ("The courts soon recognized that even when black citizens were added
to the rolls and voted, they were often still unable to elect the candidates of their
choice: The states, in direct response to the appearance of black voters, adopted
election schemes that aggregated voters' preferences in ways that minimized the im-
pact of black votes.").
123. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
124. Virginia, Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi and Georgia filed amicus curiae briefs
on behalf of the plaintiff, South Carolina. Id. at 305-06.
125. Id. at 323 ("These provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 are challenged
on the fundamental ground that they exceed the powers of Congress and encroach
on an area reserved to the States by the Constitution.").
126. Id. at 323 (alleging that § 5 infringes on Article Ill of the Constitution because
the review of voting rules direct the district court to issue advisory opinions).
127. Covered jurisdictions are those
which (1) the Attorney General determines maintained on November 1, 1972,
any test or device, and with respect to which (2) the Director of the Census
determines that less than 50 percentum of the citizens of voting-age were
registered on November 1, 1972 or less than 50 percentum of such persons
voted in the Presidential election of November 1972.
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1988).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1994).
Court rejected South Carolina's challenge and held the Act constitutional,
stating that Congress "may use any rational means to effectuate the con-
stitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.""
Following Katzenbach, the Court again interpreted the scope of sec-
tion five in Beer v. United States." The Beer Court placed the first sig-
nificant limitation on the Act.'3" In Beer, the city of New Orleans sought
preclearance of a reapportionment plan designed to increase black voting
strength." The United States Attorney General, acting under the provi-
sion of section five, refused to preclear the city's new plan because it
was discriminatory and, despite its improvements over the previous plan,
still diluted black voting strength.'3 The city challenged the application
of the Act, denying the dilution of minority voting strength compared to
the previous voting practice and argued that the Attorney General had
applied the wrong standard." The Court responded by defining the
nonretrogression doctrine, which declared that changes in voting practic-
es should be compared to the previously replaced practices rather than
subjecting them to an absolute evaluation."
Vote dilution does not lend itself to qualitative measurement, and dur-
ing this period the Court struggled to craft a standard by which to evalu-
ate it. In City of Mobile v. Bolden," the Court adopted a standard in its
plurality opinion whereby only purposeful and invidious acts of state
voting discrimination were actionable under the Voting Rights Act.
137
Justice Stewart, writing for the plurality, held that a plaintiff "must prove
that the disputed plan was 'conceived or operated as [a] purposeful
devic[e] to further racial... discrimination.""' The Court borrowed the
standard from its Fourteenth Amendment "suspect classes" cases, where
129. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324.
130. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
131. See Carter, supra note 54, at 584. The holding is a limitation on the Act be-
cause a new practice that is slightly less discriminatory than the previous practice
satisfies the non-retrogression principle and therefore does not fall within the Act. Id.
at 584-85. This is contrary to Congress' "apparent intention that the Act receive liber-
al interpretation. . . ." Id. at 584.
132. Beer, 425 U.S. at 135-36.
133. Id. at 136.
134. Id. at 133-34.
135. Id. at 141 ('[Tlhe standard [under §5] can only be satisfied by determining ...
whether [minority voting ability] is augmented, diminished, or not affected by the
change affecting voting.") (citations omitted).
136. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). Bolden addressed a challenge by black voters to an at-large
system of electing city officials. Id. at 58. The plaintiffs sought to change the system
to single-member districts, which would have presumably enabled the black contin-
gency to elect an official of their choosing. Id. Bolden represents a paradigmatic vote
dilution case because it impacts the voting procedure but not the right to vote itself.
137. Id. at 66-67.
138. Id. at 66 (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149-50 (1971)).
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courts could grant relief under the Equal Protection Clause only after
showing the defendant's intent to discriminate on the basis of race.'"
Responding to the Court's decision in Bolden, Congress amended the
Voting Rights Act in 1982 to change the intent standard as defined under
City of Mobile to a "results" standard.'" However, the amendment did
not define the results test, stating only:
[N]o Voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or proce-
dure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner
which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United
States to vote on account of race or color .... '"
Congress created the amendment to "restore the legal standard that gov-
erned voting discrimination cases prior to the Supreme Court's decision
in Bolden."'" The amendment also included a new qualifying clause,
known as the "Dole Compromise," which denied any group the right to
proportional representation.'"
The amendment's inclusion of the clause disclaiming any right to pro-
portional representation resulted in confusion for lower courts, which
had to determine when vote dilution occurred using a "totality of the cir-
cumstances"'" test.' Confusion resulted because plaintiffs trying to
139. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). Washington involved an
employment discrimination suit brought by black applicants for police department
jobs. Id. at 232-33. The plaintiffs attempted to show discriminatory action by com-
paring the disproportionately low number of black officers to the black population as
a whole. Id. at 235. The Court held that a showing of disproportionate impact is not
sufficient; a plaintiff must show intent Id. at 239-42.
140. See Grofman, supra note 1, at 1241 n.14. "In amending section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, Congress was reacting to the decision in City of Mobile. The specific
motivation behind the amended language ... was to allow plaintiffs to establish a
statutory violation by showing discriminatory effect without proving any kind of dis-
criminatory purpose." Id.
141. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1982).
142. S. Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1982).
143. The new section provided:
A violation of subsection (a) . . . is established if, based on the totality of
the circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomina-
tion or election ... are not equally open to participation by members of a
class of citizens ... in that its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice . . . . Provided, that nothing in this section
establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers
equal to their proportion in the population.
42 U.S.C. §1973(b) (1994).
144. The "totality of circumstances" test was articulated in White v. Regester, 412
establish the requisite discrimination would inevitably attempt to show
that their "group" remained unable to elect candidates in proportion to
their numbers. However, since the Dole compromise excluded the right
to proportional representation, a plaintiff could not rely on dispropor-
tional representation.4 The confusion regarding the standard for estab-
lishing a violation of the Voting Rights Act continued until 1986, when
the Supreme Court announced a new test for determining vote dilu-
tion.
4 7
Shortly after Congress amended the Voting Rights Act in 1982, the
Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of the new standard for vote
dilution. Thornburg v. Gingles'" involved a challenge to a North Caroli-
na districting plan that created six multi-member districts and one single-
member district, all containing a white majority.'4 The plaintiffs advo-
cated an alternate plan which put forth one single-member district in
which blacks comprised a majority of the voting population."5 The
Court used this opportunity to attempt to establish a workable test for
determining when state action violates the Voting Rights Act.'
The Gingles decision announced a three-prong test for vote dilution:
(1) the minority population must be sufficiently large and geographically
compact enough to constitute a majority in a single-member. district; (2)
minority voters must be "politically cohesive;" and (3) the majority must
vote as a bloc to defeat minority-preferred candidates."' While an im-
U.S. 755, 769 (1973), and was the standard for determining a vote dilution claim prior
to the Court's decision in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). Karpiak, supra
note 115, at 637.
145. See id. at 636 ("[Tihe amendment included portentous qualifying language
which would ultimately spawn confusion.").
146. See id.
147. See id. at 637-39 (noting that the Gingles test was an attempt to provide a
"workable test" and met with limited success).
148. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
149. A multi-member district is one in which each voter casts a ballot for every
office in the election. Karlan, supra note 120, at 7 n.23. For example, the election of
U.S. Senators creates a multi-member district of each state because a voter casts a
ballot for both senators. Id. Conversely, a single member district elects only one
official to office. Id. A multi-member district was often used to dilute minority voting
strength, and the plaintiffs In Gingles brought this very charge. Gingles, 478 U.S. at
35. The reasoning is as follows: Assume a population of 6096 whites and 4096 minori-
ties, and that voting follows racial lines (bloc voting). In a multi-member district with
10 offices to be filled, whites could elect all 10 offices because whites constitute a
majority of all votes cast for each office. However, if 10 single member districts are
drawn, minorities could expect to constitute a majority in four of the 10 districts
(40%) and consequently elect four representatives.
150. Id. at 35-38.
151. Id. at 50-51.
152. Id. See generaUy Quinn et al., supra note 16.
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provement on the results standard given by the 1982 amendment, the
Gingles test has been criticized for failing to adequately guide lower
courts as to when vote dilution claims may be filed.1' Consequently,
these courts turn to the proportional standard test despite the provisions
of the Dole Compromise.'"
Gingles embodied the Court's last major interpretation of the Voting
Rights Act. The Court has not balked at the use of racial classifications
when incorporated into judicial remedies." However, another aspect of
this principle stands separate and apart from the voting rights issue: the
emergence of the Equal Protection Clause in the Court's analysis regard-
ing the affirmative use of race to categorize citizens in non-voting mat-
ters."
B. Discrimination and Racial Classifications
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."'57 Courts have not held this provision to guar-
antee that all laws must treat every person the same. In practical effect,
certain laws require that classifications be made that disproportionately
burden some individuals while benefiting others." The question then
becomes, "when can a state properly classify citizens on the basis of
race?"
The Court's original interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause was
a narrow one. In the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court stated, "[W]e
doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of
153. Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 770-71 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1028 (1991).
154. See id.; United States v. Dallas County Comm'n, 850 F. 2d 1433, 1434-35 (11th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1030 (1989); Terrazas v. Slagle, 789 F. Supp. 828,
833 (W.D. Tex. 1991); Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196, 198 (E.D. Ark. 1989); see
also Yanos, supra note 16, at 1828 ("[L]ower federal courts have consistently used a
proportional standard in subsequent Section 2 cases despite the provisions of the
Dole Compromise.").
155. See, e.g., United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (permitting the cre-
ation of a majority-minority district to remedy previous violations of the Voting Rights
Act).
156. See iiifra notes 157-96 and accompanying text.
157. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
158. For example, income tax laws apply differently to citizens of different income
levels. Similarly, wage and hour laws do not apply to persons in certain occupations.
159. 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race,
will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision."'" In
Strauder v. West Virginia,' the Court invalidated a statute that limited
jury duty to whites only."s In referring to the Equal Protection Clause,
the Court stated that "all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand
equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored race,
for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no
discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their col-
or.- m
1. Classifications Disadvantaging Minorities
As early as 1915, the Court recognized that a state action may involve
the impermissible use of race even though it appears race-neutral on its
face.' In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,'" the Court found a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause even though there was no mention of race in the
statute in question.' The case involved a San Francisco ordinance
which declared unlawful the operation of a laundry business in a wooden
building without a permit.' 7 The plaintiff, a man of Chinese ancestry
who was denied a permit, challenged the ordinance on constitutional
grounds since the board of supervisors had denied two hundred permits
to ethnic Chinese residents while granting them to eighty non-Chinese
applicants.'" The plaintiff claimed that while the statute was not uncon-
stitutional on its face, its application constituted a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause." The Court held:
Though the law itself [is] fair on its face and impartial in appearance... if it is
applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal
hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons
in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still
within the prohibition of the Constitution.'"
160. Id. at 81.
161. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
162. Id. at 310-12.
163. Id. at 307.
164. See Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915).
165. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
166. Id. at 373-74.
167. Id. at 357.
168. Id. at 374.
169. Id. at 369.
170. Id. at 373-74. The Court in Shaw cited the Yick Wo case for the proposition
that in some rare cases, race-neutral action on its face may conceal a racial agenda.
Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2825 (1993) ("[Cllasslfication that is ostensibly neutral
but is an obvious pretext for racial discrimination.").
[Vol. 22: 727, 1995] Death of the Voting Rights Act
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
In 1954, the Court decided Brown v. Board of Education,7' which
struck down state-imposed racial segregation in public schools because it
violated the Equal Protection Clause."m The Court rejected the "separate
but equal" doctrine in Brown and held that the segregation of school
children on the basis of race deprives minority children of equal educa-
tional opportunities. The Brown decision was subsequently applied to
other public facilities such as public beaches, 4 public transporta-
tion,'76 and theaters."
In 1976, the Court addressed the requirement of discriminatory intent
in Washington v. Davis.'" In Washington, black police applicants al-
leged that the recruiting procedures of the District of Columbia Metro-
politan Police Department unconstitutionally discriminated on the basis
of race." The complaint focused on a written personnel test that pur-
portedly excluded a disproportionately high number of black applicants
and bore no relation to job performance. In reversing the appellate
court's holding that the disproportionate impact comprised a constitu-
tional violation,"n the Court declared that "standing alone, [dispropor-
tionate impact] does not trigger the rule... that racial classifications are
to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny."8' The Court reasoned that,
"[T]he central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the
basis of race."" The Washington decision stood for the important prin-
ciple that a plaintiff challenging legislation that is not discriminatory on
its face cannot rely solely on a showing of a disproportional burden on a
particular minority group.'"
171. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
172. Id. at 495 ("[P]laintiffs . . . are, by reason of the segregation complained of,
deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.").
173. Id.
174. See Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
175. See Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (enjoining racial segregation of city
buses).
176. See Schiro v. Bynum, 375 U.S. 395 (1964).
177. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 237.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 237-39.
183. Accord Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev., 429 U.S. 252,
265-66 (1977) (stating that "official action will not be held unconstitutional solely
2. Classifications Benefitting Minorities
Not all of the cases alleging improper racial classifications involve
discrimination against the race identified. In the famous Bakke deci-
sion,"M a white applicant challenged the admissions policy of a medical
school that allocated a percentage of its openings to minorities under the
Equal Protection Clause.'85 In an extremely divided panel, Justice
Powell, delivering the Court's opinion, evidenced an unwillingness to
distinguish between classifications that burdened minorities and classifi-
cations that benefitted them."M Powell stated: "Racial and ethnic distinc-
tions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exact-
ing judicial scrutiny."" However, Justices Brennan, Marshall, White and
Blackmun concurred only in the judgment, declaring that "the central
meaning of today's opinions [is that] [g]overnment may take race into
account when it acts not to demean or insult any racial group, but to
remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial prejudice.""
When the Court returned to the issue of affirmative action in 1989, it
viewed race-conscious state action much more suspiciously. In City of
Richmond v. Croson, the Court held that "the standard of review un-
der the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those
burdened or benefitted by a particular classification," and that the ap-
propriate standard of review was strict scrutiny.' Justice O'Connor,
writing for the Croson majority, offered two rationales for the use of
strict scrutiny. First, she argued that the determination of whether a
classification was truly "benign or remedial" and not the product of local
racial politics could only be achieved by applying strict scrutiny." Sec-
ond, Justice O'Connor indicated that race-consciousness is, in and of
itself, pernicious, as it impedes society's natural progression toward race
because it results in disproportionate impact").
184. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
185. Id. at 277. The plaintiff demonstrated that he had both a higher grade point
average and a higher MCAT score than other applicants who were admitted under
the "special (minority) admissions" program. Id.
186. Id. at 290.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 325.
189. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). Oroson involved Richmond's plan to require its prime con-
tractors to subcontract at least 3096 of their construction contracts to minority busi-
nesses. Id. at 477.
190. Id. at 494.
191. Id. at 493. The portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion indicating the appropriate
standard of review was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and
Kennedy. In addition, Justice Scalia agreed that strict scrutiny must be applied to all
governmental racial classifications. Id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring).
192. Id. at 493.
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neutrality and color blindness." Croson was an important decision in
so far as it delineated the bright line on racial classifications for affirma-
tive purposes: The use of race to classify citizens requires strict scrutiny
regardless of the justification.
Summarizing the Court's treatment of racial classifications, it appears
that the Court now views race as a suspect classification and, when im-
plemented by a state, such legislation must be narrowly tailored to serve
a compelling state interest.'" The Court currently remains unwilling to
distinguish between classifications that benefit minorities and those
which burden them, ipplying strict scrutiny to both cases." Finally, a
plaintiff bringing an Equal Protection claim to challenge facially race-
neutral legislation must. do more than establish its disparate impact on
different races."
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION
A. Justice O'Connor's Majority Opinion
1. Introduction
The Court decided Shaw by the barest of margins, with Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion gathering only four other votes.' 7 Although
there were no concurring opinions, Justices White, Blackmun,"'
Stevens," and Soutern each wrote a separate dissenting opinion. The
majority concluded that racially apportioned Congressional districts'
193. Id. at 492-98.
194. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.; 476 U.S. 267, 273-74, 279-80 (1986).
195. Id. at 273 ("[T]he level of scrutiny does not change merely because the chal-
lenged classification operates against a group that historically has not been subject to
discrimination.")..
196. See supra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
197. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct 2816 (1993). Justice O'Connor was joined by the
Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia. Id.
198. Id. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 2843 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
200. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 2845 (Souter, J., dissenting).
202. The majority's opinion focuses on the unusual shape of the 12th district, and
specifically. leaves open the question of whether "'the intentional creation of ... [ra-
cially determined] districts, without more' always gives rise to an equal protection
claim." Id. at 2828 (citations omitted). In limiting its holding to a district "so irratlo-
must withstand strict scrutiny, even if such apportionment constitutes a
response to the Congressional mandates of the Voting Rights Act.as The
decision reflects a major departure from the Court's stance regarding
previous state responses to the Voting Rights Act' and leaves many
commentators wondering about the Act's future.'
The decision permitted five white North Carolina voters to challenge
the state's creation of a majority-minority district as a violation of the
nal on its face that It can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters . . .
because of their race," id. at 2832, the Court implied that an important distinction
could be drawn between the use of race to create odd-shaped districts and the use
of race to create compact, contiguous districts. See Alienikoff & Issacharoff, supra
note 34, at 610. "[A] bizarrely shaped district bespeaks a willful manipulation of the
districting system to force an electoral outcome upon a disinclined electorate .... A
'natural' compact district sends no such message, even if it has been defined to cre-
ate a majority-minority district." Id.
203. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832. The Voting Rights Act requires that any changes to
the voting practices of a state covered under § 5 must not work to dilute minority
voting strength. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1981 & Supp. 1994). Accordingly, § 5 barred
North Carolina from implementing any change resulting in a relative decrease in mi-
nority voting strength. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976). Because
§ 5 covers 40 of North Carolina's 100 counties, the Act required the legislature to
draw the new 12th district in such a way that a black representative would possess
a likely chances of being elected or risk violating the Act's nonretrogression provi-
sion. See Alienikoff and Issacharoff, supra note 34, at 591 n.13 ("In its objection
letter to the state, the Department of Justice identified the failure to create a second
majority-black congressional district as the grounds for its failure to preclear ....
[ThereforeJ the state was obligated to meet the terms of the objections set forth by
the Department of Justice."). Speaking on behalf of the Lawyers Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law, attorney Frank Parker stated: "This puts states into a bind, a
Catch-22 .... If states fail to elect more minorities, they will violate the Voting
Rights Act . . . [but] if they use racial criteria to draw boundaries, they may violate
the Constitution." David Savage, High Court Rules Against 'Racial Gerrymandering,'
LA. TIMES, June 29, 1993, at Al.
204. See United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 161 (1977) ("[Tihe Constitution
does not prevent a State subject to the Voting Rights-Act from deliberately creating
or preserving black majorities in particular districts in order to ensure that its reap-
portionment plan complies with § 5."); see also Lani Guiner, No Two Seats: The
Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L REV. 1413, 1420-21 (1991). "Because
entrenched discrimination in the covered jurisdictions persisted, and continues to per-
sist ... the United States Supreme Court has consistently interpreted section 5 to
give it 'the broadest possible scope.'" Id. (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393
U.S. 544, 567 (1969)).
205. See Dick Lehr, High Court Backs Off Race-Based Preferences, BOSTON GLOBE,
July 11, 1993, § 3, at 1 (quoting Harvard law professor Laurence Tribe in noting that
the Shaw decision Indicates the Court *is moving away from the Voting Rights Act,
even casting a constitutional cloud over it"); Stuart Taylor Jr., Making a Mess Instead
of a Rule for Racial Gerrymanders, THE RECORDER, July 13, 1993, at 6 ("If the Court
were to carry its logic to the point of requiring 'color-blind' districting, it would crip-
ple the abilities of Congress, the states and the courts to protect black voters' rights
to the equal representation promised by the Voting Rights Act.").
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Equal Protection Clause.' Prior to Shaw, the Court required that a
challenge to state voting practices demonstrate that either the govern-
mental body unfairly prevented an individual from casting a ballot,' or
that the practice effectively diluted the strength of the group to which
the complaining voter belonged.' In Shaw, however, the Court recog-
nized a new cause of action by allowing a voter to challenge a reappor-
tionment statute by merely alleging that race constituted a predominant
factor in the creation of an electoral district.'s While the full effect of
the Shaw decision remains to be seen, at a minimum it clearly impacts a
state's ability to comply with the Voting Rights Act.10 It also limits a
state's ability to remedy historic discriminatory voting practices."' In
the more extreme case, this decision could effectively eviscerate the
Voting Rights Act and prevent future state action designed to remedy
discrimination against minority voters."'
206. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2831-32. The Court concluded that legislation that distin-
guishes citizens on the basis of race, even when intended to remedy prior voting dis-
crimination, shall be subject to strict scrutiny. Id,
207. For example, the use of literary tests as a prerequisite to voting was held by
the Court to be unconstitutional. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 367 (1915).
Similarly, the Court has struck down poll taxes and other impediments to voting. See
supra notes 63-92 and accompanying text
208. See United Jewish, 430 U.S. at 165 (holding that New York's reapportionment
plan "did not minimize or unfairly cancel out white voting strength").
209. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832 ("[Ajppelants have stated a claim under the Equal
Protection Clause by alleging that the North Carolina [districting scheme] can be un-
derstood only as an effort to segregate voters . . .because of their race ....").
210. See Richard H. Pildes and Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Dis-
tricts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v.
Reno, 92 MICH. L REV. 483, 485 (1993) (discussing the conflicting directives of the
Shaw decision and the Voting Rights Act).
211. Id.
212. The Voting Rights Act is important for its ability to remedy state voting prac-
tices that abridge or dilute minority voting strength. Such remedial measures neces-
sarily require the use of classifications to rectify previous discriminatory practices.
Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2835 (White, J., dissenting) ("[Elxtirpating such [racial] consider-
ations from the redistricting process is unrealistic. . . ."); see also Pildes & Niemi, su-
pra note 210, at 486 (the Voting Rights Act "not only permits, but requires
policymakers, in certain specific circumstances, to be race conscious when they draw
electoral district lines"). If the Court's decision holds that the use of racial discrimi-
nation in this manner is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, thereby eliminat-
ing its remedial value, the Act amounts to nothing more than a diagnosis without a
cure.
2. What Injury is Being Protected Against?
The new cause of action recognized by the Shaw majority is somewhat
of a paradox. In adopting this cause of action, the majority opinion relied
exclusively on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and rejected any Fifteenth Amendment vote dilution arguments. '
The paradox lies in the fact that the new cause of action exclusively
reflects a voter's remedy, yet the harm stands independent of any injury
attributable to voting."1 4 The essence of the plaintiffs' claim was that the
Constitution, and specifically the Fourteenth Amendment, guaranteed
them the "right to participate in a 'colorblind' electoral process.""5 Fu-
ture plaintiffs pleading this new cause of action need not show that a
state's districting plan would reduce a group's voting strength, or even
that the districting would likely have any effect on the election re-
sults. ' The plaintiff need only show that the electoral process was
tainted by district lines drawn along racial boundaries without sufficient
justification.217
213. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2828. "Classifying citizens by race, as we have said....
threatens special harms that are not present .in our vote-dilution cases. It therefore
warrants different analysis." Id. But see Gomililon v. Llghtfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
Gomiion involved a geometrically square municipal district which was redrawn into
a 28-sided figure in order to exclude black communities on the city's perimeter,
thereby preserving a white majority. Id. at 340-41. The Court held that the racially
based gerrymander violated the 15th Amendment, but did not address the 14th
Amendment argument. Id. at 345.
Justice White's dissent in Shaw unnecessarily focuses on the plaintiffs vote dilu-
tion claim even though this claim was expressly denounced by the majority. See in-
fra notes 291-97 and accompanying text.
214. Shaw, 113 S. Ct at 2832. The injury, the majority claims, is one to society. Id.
'Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society ....
Racial gerrymandering... threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political
system in which race no longer matters." Id.
215. Id. at 2824. The Equal Protection Clause reads: "No Stae shall make or en-
force any law which shall . . . deny to any person withi6 Its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. The Court has recognized that
while Congress may address the effects of racial discrimination, states will only be
permitted to address the same effects by adhering to the constraints of the 14th
Amendment. City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989).
That Congress may Identify and redress the effects of society-wide discrimina-
tion does not mean that, a fortiori, the States and their political subdivisions
are free to decide that such remedies are appropriate. Section 1 of the Four-
teenth Amendment is an explicit constraint on state power, and the States
must undertake any remedial efforts in accordance with that provision. To
hold otherwise would be to cede control over the content of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause to the 50 state legislatures and their myriad political subdivi-
sions.
Id.
216. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2816.
217. Id. at 2832. The majority's opinion suggests that compliance with the Voting
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In upholding the plaintiffs' claim, the Court has apparently extended
the Croson"8 decision to the field of voting rights cases." By eliminat-
ing the vote dilution argument from the calculation, the majority's opin-
ion appears considerably weakened when the consequences of the deci-
sion are weighed against the injury sought to be prevented.'s In striving
Rights Act alone will not satisfy the "sufficient justification" necessary to withstand
strict scrutiny. Id. at 2831. "[W]e do not read Beer or any of our other § 5 cases to
give covered jurisdictions carte blanche to engage in racial gerrymandering in the
name of nonretrogression." Id. (discussing Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976)).
218. See supra notes 189-93 and accompanying text.
219. There are many unanswered questions involving the scope of the Shaw deci-
sion. These questions will persist until the Court defines the limitations on this vague
cause of action. However, the Court's decision seemingly applied the holding in
Croson to districting applications. See Alienikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 34, at 644
("Croson exhibits extreme unfriendliness to race-conscious measures, rejecting com-
mon-sense readings of the historical and social context of the city's action and insist-
ing upon a burdensome level of proof of prior discrimination."). The Croson majority
stated: "While there is no doubt that the sorry history of both private and public
discrimination in this country has contributed to a lack of opportunities for black
entrepreneurs, this observation, standing alone, cannot justify a rigid racial quota in
the awarding of public contracts in Richmond, Virginia." City of Richmond v. Croson,
488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989). The Shaw majority has signalled North Carolina and other
states that even the presence of previous racial discrimination is not a satisfactory
justification for the conscious use of race in creating congressional districts. Shaw,
113 S. Ct. at 2831-32. Although recognizing a state's "interest in eradicating the ef-
fects of past racial discrimination," the Court noted that a state "must [nevertheless]
have a 'strong basis in evidence for [concluding] that remedial action is necessary.'"
Id. (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 500).
220. While voting practices may infringe on both individual and group interests,
most commentators agree that once complete access to the voting process has been
achieved, group rights become the mnaln concern. See Guinier, supra note 204, at
1423 n.36 ("Because the political process comprehends more than the ballot box and
the formal right to enter the polling place, nonrepresentation for any group of voters
is the evil to be eradicated."). The injury cannot be assumed to be to the individuals
themselves, who have not been denied the right to cast a ballot and have it counted.
See Shapiro, supra note 16, at 198 ("[Bloth legislative and judicial history suggest
that [the Voting Rights Act] creates group rights reaching far beyond the rights of
individuals to register and to vote."). But see Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533, 561
(1964) (Chief Justice Warren stated that voting rights, like other rights derived from
the Equal Protection Clause, are "individual and personal in nature"). Nor are voters
of any group entitled to have their candidate elected. See Sanford Levinson, Commen-
tary: Gerrymandering and the Brooding Omnipresence of Proportional Representa-
tion: Why Won't It Go Away?, 33 UCLA L REV. 257, 270 (1985) ("Courts have insist-
ed up to now that the Constitution does not guarantee proportional representation.);
Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2846 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining that "one's constitutional
rights are not violated merely because the candidate one supports loses the elec-
to protect the plaintiffs' right to participate in a colorblind electoral pro-
cess, a right that is somewhat dubious despite its idealistic goals,221 the
Court brought into question the use of. districting as a remedy to viola-
tions of the Voting Rights Act.m
Despite Justice O'Connor's repeated warnings of the evils of racial
classifications, the cause of action recognized by the majority is likely to
be used in the future for political gain.223 When viewed in this light, the
majority's decision could contravene vital civil rights legislation that one
commentator described as "the most successful... of the century,"2
by allowing individual voters to bring this cause of action and complain
of an injury to society. Ironically, the majority's decision may impede,
rather than further, society's goal of a colorblind political system.
tion"). In Shaw, the injury cannot be considered a group right because the majority
rejected the vote dilution argument, that being an injury to a group rather than an
individual. Id. at 2824. Furthermore, the white plaintiffs cannot claim that they as a
race suffer a social stigma from the classification. See United Jewish Org. v. Carey,
430 U.S. 144, 165 (1977) (finding New York's plan "represented no racial slur or stig-
ma with respect to whites or any other race"). The "injury" complained of by the
plaintiffs in Shaw is neither an individual injury nor a group injury, but rather an
injury to society in general. See Alienikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 34, at 514 (not-
ing that the injury in Shaw, an inability to participate in a colorblind electoral pro-
cess, is shared by the public in general).
221. The Court acknowledges that a state legislature "always is aware of race when
it draws district lines." Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2826. This principle renders the majority's
decision all the more curious when one considers North Carolina's record concerning
the success of African-American Congressional candidates. Prior to the redistricting,
North Carolina had not elected an African-American representative to Congress since
the Reconstruction. See Joan Biskupic, Court Lets Whites Challenge 'Bizarre' Redis-
tricting Plans; States Must Show 'Compelling' Reason in Aiding Minorities, WASH.
PosT, June 29, 1993, at Al.
222. Although the majority explicitly left open the question of whether the use of
majority-minority districts will necessarily result in a violation of the 14th
Amendment, Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2828, the Court reiterated that "a racial classifica-
tion, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld
only upon an extraordinary justification." Id. at 2825 (quoting Personnel Adm'r of
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (emphasis added)).
223. The majority's recognition of a cause of action based on the use of race in
drawing congressional districts can now be asserted by a losing political faction in an
odd-shaped district. If the faction can show that race was a primary consideration in
the creation of the district, which is the case for many of the majority-minority dis-
tricts around the country, then the district must satisfy strict scrutiny analysis or be
redrawn. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct at 2816.
224. Grofman, supra note 1, at 1247.
225. There are many commentators who contend that the election of minority lead-
ers is the only way to gain acceptance of white majority voters. See, e.g., Abrams,
supra note 2, at 503 ("The election of minority representatives is a crucial first step
toward a nondiscriminatory political process."); see also Shapiro, supra note 16, at
204. "While the costs imposed by affirmatively gerrymandered districts are real and
nontrivial, they pale in comparison with the alternative: nothing less than a society
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The majority's argument focuses squarely on the evils of racial classifi-
cations. The majority correctly notes that racial classifications pose sig-
nificant dangers to a society based on the equality of man.' Drawing
districts along racial boundaries reinforces racial stereotypes, perpetu-
ates racial bloc voting' and violates the American political principle of
geographical representation.' Furthermore, as the majority points out,
racial districting signals elected officials that they need only represent
the racial group that elected them rather than their entire constituen-
cy.' As an enlightened society, we must view the goal of a colorblind
society as an essential destination, and the decision in Shaw as a step to-
ward that goal.
The problem with the majority's decision in Shaw is its failure to rec-
ognize the need for race-based classifications to remedy past discrimina-
tory practices.' Previously in Croson" and Metro Broadcasting,'
the Court acceded to this very contention, but the majority in Shaw con-
where political power is perpetually stratified along racial lines." Id. "[The assump-
tion] that without safe districting, racial polarization will subside-is untenable. The
refusal to redress the continuing subordination of blacks in American politics is more
likely to increase conflict." Id. at 204 n.93.
226. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832 ("Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of
lasting harm to society .... Racial classifications with respect to voting carry partic-
ular dangers.").
227. Id. at 2827.
228. See Grofman, supra note 1, at 1262-63. The author emphasizes that common
sense geographical boundaries are essential to effective representation. Id. Further-
more, a consequence of ill-defined districts is a difficulty in dislodging incumbents.
Id. See generally Howard & Howard, supra note 2. The authors argue that the use of
race in an attempt to predetermine the results of an election "pollutes" the integrity
of the electoral process by giving one group an advantage over other groups. Id. at
1619.
229. Shaw, 113 S. Ct at 2827.
230. It is the author's contention that the use of race to eradicate the harms of
prior racial discrimination is a sufficient justification to pass the strict scrutiny test.
Although the Court previously suggested that remedying these harms is a compelling
state interest, see infra notes 246-48 and accompanying text, the Court in Shaw ig-
nores this argument.
231. City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 491-93 (1989). "Classifications based
on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for reme-
dial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a poli-
tics of racial hostility." Id, at 493.
232. Metro Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547, 601
(1990) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Today the Court firmly rejects the proposition that a
governmental decision that rests on a racial classification is never permissible except
as a remedy for a past wrong.").
spicuously fails to address this possibility.' The Court's failure to ad-
dress the issue is problematic since it creates uncertainty and will un-
doubtedly produce more litigation. 4
3. Previous Treatment of Racial Gerrymanders
The majority in Shaw went to great lengths in order to establish that
North Carolina's reapportionment plan, while race-neutral on its face,
was "so irrational... that it [could] be understood only as an effort to
segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their
race .... "I However, the Court's efforts to frame the plan as race-
based was completely unnecessary because the appellees freely conced-
ed the plan involved racial classifications. 2m Once the majority deter-
mined that North Carolina's plan did in fact constitute a racial classifica-
tion, it then turned to the Court's previous treatment of state districting
along racial lines.
In establishing the race-based nature of North Carolina's plan, the
majority first emphasized that it constituted a racial gerrymander 7 sim-
ilar to the one struck down by the Court in GomiUion.' However,
while on the surface North Carolina's plan resembles the Tuskeegee
gerrymander in GomiUion, there are two important distinctions between
them. First, Gomilion was a vote dilution case decided by the Court on
Fifteenth Amendment grounds. In contrast, the Shaw majority expressly
233. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2831-32. While as a method the majority acknowledges that
the court has allowed racial classifications to eradicate "the effects of past racial dis-
crimination," the majority neither acknowledges the presence of past discrimination
nor does it give any indication that it will approve of such measures in the future.
Id.
234. See Alienikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 34, at 643 (suggesting that Shaw may
"have inaugurated a decennial plague of litigation chlMenging the reapportionment
plans of states caught between a race-conscious, group-based Voting Rights Act and
the individualistic, near colorblind ideology of Croson").
235. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832.
236. Appellees' Supplemental Brief at 2, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (No.
92-357) (characterizing North Carolina's creation of the majority-minority districts as
"deliberate").
237. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824 ("It is unsettling how closely the North Carolina plan
resembles the most egregious racial gerrymanders of the past."). "Gerrymandering" is
the "process of dividing a state ... with such a geographical arrangement as to
accomplish an ulterior or unlawful purpose as, for instance, to secure a majority for
a given political party in districts where the result could be otherwise if they were
divided according to obvious natural lines." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 687 (6th ed.
1990).
238. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2826-27. The Court describes the district in Gomilion as
an example of a districting plan which is "so highly irregular that, on Its face, it ra-
tionaly cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to 'segregat[e] ...
voters' on the basis of race." Id.
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rejected any vote dilution arguments,29 holding that the type of
districting at issue "require[s] careful scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause."2'
Second, there is a critical distinction between the purposes underlying
the district lines in GomiUion and the North Carolina plan. The Court in
GomiUion found the City of Tuskeegee's systematic removal of "all save
four or five of its 400 negro voters" to constitute an attempt to deprive
the excluded blacks of the benefits of residency.2" On the other hand,
North Carolina's redistricting reflected a response to the Voting Rights
Act' and 120 years of complete exclusion of elected black representa-
tives.' The Court's decision to put the North Carolina plan in the same
category as the Tuskeegee district clearly stands contrary to Congress'
intent in enacting the Voting Rights Act" and cannot be squared with
other recent decisions on this issue.m
4. Previous Treatment of Racial Classifications
Justice O'Connor's opinion next focused on the evils of racial classifi-
cations and the Court's previous treatment of racial classification under
Fourteenth Amendment analysis. Echoing the justifications for strict
scrutiny that she wrote in Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,' Justice
O'Connor once again declared that strict scrutiny is necessary to deter-
mine whether a racial classification is "benign." " Since few, if any, ap-
239. See supra notes 213-17 and accompanying text.
240. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2826 (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 348
(1960) (Whittaker, J., concurring). It is curious that Justice O'Connor cites GomiUion
to support her Equal Protection contention because only one justice in GomiUion
decided the case on 14th Amendment grounds. Gomijion, 364 U.S. at 349.
(Whittaker, J., concurring).
241. Id. at 341.
242. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2831.
243. Id. at 2831-32.
244. See Abrams, supra note 2, at 520 ("The approach that most courts currently
favor [to violations of the Voting Rights Act] creates one or more supermajority 'safe'
districts, in which minority group members comprise at least sixty-five percent of the
population. This arrangement falls within a category of race conscious remedies that
the framers of the Voting Rights Act explicitly anticipated.").
245. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (stating that "the central
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment is prevention of offi-
cial conduct discriminating on the basis of race").
246. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
247. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2830 ("[T]he very reason that the Equal Protection Clause
demands strict scrutiny of all racial classifications is because without it, a court can-
plications of racial classifications will survive strict scrutiny as the Court
has applied it,m the majority essentially eliminated the use of racial
classifications for any purpose.
Detailing the insidious nature of racial classifications, the majority
relied on language from Hirabayashi v. United States:'
Classifications of citizens solely on the basis of race 'are by their nature odious to
a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.' ...
Accordingly, we have held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires state legisla-
tion that expressly distinguishes among citizens because of their race to be nar-
rowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest'
An important distinction can be drawn between the racial- classification
cases cited by the Court and the North Carolina redistricting. In
Hirabayashi v. United States,"± Loving v. Virginia,' and Brown v.
Board of Education,' the racial classifications at issue contained a
corresponding denial of a privilege or right. Citizens, depending on their
not determine whether or not the discrimination truly is benign.").
248. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(stating that "we concluded that such programs should not be subjected to conven-
tional 'strict scrutiny'--scrutiny that is strict in theory, but fatal in fact"); see also
Alienikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 34, at 592 (explaining that government decisions
based on racial classifications demand "extraordinary justification-a burden few such
decisions were expected to, or could meet").
249. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
250. Shaw, 113 S Ct at 2824-25 (quoting Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100).
251. 320 U.S. 81 (1943). Concerning the state-imposed 8 p.m. curfew of citizens of
Japanese ancestry, the Court denounced racial classifications in general, but upheld
the application at bar because of the exigencies associated with a state of war. Id at
100, 102.
252. 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (holding that states may not prohibit interracial marriages
because such prohibitions violate the Equal Protection Clause).
253. 347 U.S. 483 (1955). Brown was a class action challenging the racial segrega-
tion of school children. Id. at 487-88. Brown bears the closest resemblance to Shaw
in that citizens (here children) were not denied a right, but merely identified for
purposes of being placed in one school rather than another. Id. at 493 ("[P]hysical
facilities and other 'tangible' factors [were] equal."). However, Brown can be distin-
guished from Shaw in that each member of a race was not only identified but also
segregated. Id. at 494. The stigma associated with the state's classification was pres-
ent for all of society to witness. Id. (stating that "the policy of separating the races
is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group"). The state in
Shaw made no uniform assignment, but instead made the racial classification for
"counting purposes" only. See infra note 255; see also Shaw, 113 S. Ct at 2849 n.9
(Souter, J., dissenting). In Shaw, Justice Souter noted:
[I]t seems utterly implausible to me to presume ... that North Carolina's
creation of this strangely-shaped majority-minority district "generates" within
the white plaintiffs here anything comparable to "a feeling of inferiority as to
their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a
way unlikely ever to be undone."
Id. (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 494).
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heritage, were either prohibited from participating in an activity or sin-
gled out and treated separately on the basis of race.'
In Shaw, North Carolina has classified voters on the basis of race to
serve a "counting" function only.' This districting neither affords nor
abridges any rights, and each voter may cast his or her vote in full ac-
cordance with Constitutionally protected rights.s Furthermore, the
classification is transparent to society in that no social stigma can be
associated with the classification."' The absence of an identifiable stig-
ma associated with the districting process distinguishes Shaw with the
other racial classification cases identified by the majority. When consid-
ered in this light, the requirement of strict scrutiny in this case should be
replaced by a greater deference to state legislatures.'s
5. Why do Appearances Matter?
The most enigmatic aspect of the majority's opinion is the extent to
254. See, e.g., Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 83 (explaining that American citizens of
Japanese ancestry living in a military area were confined to their residences between
8 p.m. and 6 am.); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (discussing bans on inter-
racial marriages); Brown, 347 U.S. at 487-88 (discussing segregation of African-Ameri-
can school children).
255. In order to meet what it considers to be an appropriate percentage of African-
American voters in its 12 districts, North Carolina classifies its voters on the basis of
race in order to "count" them. The classification is transparent to the individual vot-
ers, who register and vote for the candidate of their choice as though no classifica-
tion had occurred. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2816.
256. Justice Souter raises this distinction by arguing that a separate Equal Protec-
tion analysis should exist for voting and non-voting cases. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2846
(Souter, J., dissenting).
A second distinction between districting and most other governmental deci-
sions in which race has figured is that those other decisions using racial cri-
teria characteristically occur in circumstances in which the use of race to the
advantage of one person is necessarily at the obvious expense of a member
of a different race .... In districting, by contrast, the mere placement of an
individual in one district instead of another denies no one a right or benefit
provided to others.
Id.
257. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2826 ("A reapportionment statute typically does not classify
persons at all; it classifies tracts of land, or addresses."); see also id. at 2849 n.9
(Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that "the complaint nowhere alleges any type of stig-
matic harm").
258. The requisite showing of a discriminatory history that would mandate such
classifications is also necessary.
which the Court is willing to extend the principle of a colorblind elec-
toral process and the consequences of its action. At one end of the spec-
trum, North Carolina's twelfth district may be so irregular that it renders
the decision an anomaly, lacking any practical significance.' At the
other end, the decision may sound the death knell for the creation of
majority-minority districts." Recognizing the quandary that states
would be left in without further guidance, the majority appears to have
provided a "backdoor" through which states could accomplish the results
intended by the North Carolina legislature without violating a voter's
Fourteenth Amendment right."'
The Court warns that when it comes to reapportionment, "appearances
do matter."' In the context of the Court's opinion, it appears that in
order for a plaintiff to bring a successful claim under this new cause of
action, a state must disregard "traditional districting principles such as
compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions." It
may be inferred from the Court's language and its choice to distin-
guish,' rather than overrule United Jewish Organizations, that a state
may accomplish its intended result as long as it maintains traditional
districting principles.'s
259. Id. at 2848 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The shape of the district at issue in this
case is indeed so bizarre that few other examples are ever likely to carry the un-
equivocal implication of impermissible use of race that the Court finds here."). In-
deed, the majority ignored North Carolina's other majority-minority district, the first
district, which the majority described as "somewhat hook shaped," resembling "a bug
splattered on a windshield," and similar in appearance to a "Rorschach ink-blot test."
Id. at 2820.
260. Clearly, the use of safe districts will soon be a thing of the past if the majori-
ty actually applies the holding in Croson, that prohibits all uses of racial classifica-
tions without proper justification, especially if neither compliance with the Voting
Rights Act nor remedying prior racial discrimination provides proper justification. See
generally City of Richmond v. J.A. Crosen Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
261. See Allenikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 34, at 646 n.243 (noting that compact
districts could be immunized from constitutional requirements because with compact
districts, "there are simply too many other variables that states may legitimately take
into account, such as geography and political boundaries, in drawing districts").
262. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
263. The majority does not concede that even if a state adheres to these principles,
it will be exempt from a claim of racial gerrymandering. Id. at 2827. The majority
states that the traditional districting principles are merely "objective factors that may
serve to defeat a claim that a district has been gerrymandered on racial lines." Id.
264. Id. at 2829 (stating that "UJO's framework simply does not apply where, as
here, a reapportionment plan is alleged to be so irrational on its face that it immedi-
ately offends principles of racial equality").
265. See id. at 2826.
[W]hen members of a racial group live together in one community, a reappor-
tionment plan that concentrates members of the group in one district and ex-
cludes them from others may reflect wholly legitimate purposes. The district
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While both the majority and the dissents agree that the Constitution
does not require a districting plan to exhibit characteristics such as com-
pactness and contiguity,' their absence can produce a far more tangi-
ble injury to voters than the majority ultimately recognizes. A district
where boundaries are drawn in such a way that its residents cannot
identify a distinct geographical rationale, deprives its residents of the
type of district that the American political system is meant to provide. 7
The use of cognizable districts facilitates the activities essential to
electoral success, such as campaigning, mobilizing and forming allianc-
es.'s Therefore, when state legislatures ignore the principles of sound
districting in order to implement political agendas, the harm done to the
residents of the affected districts greatly outweighs the harm caused by
the racial "counting" that occurred in Shaw.'s
While the Court emphasized that no constitutional standard requiring a
district to be compact or contiguous exists, the Court previously required
other plaintiffs to make a showing of geographical compactness to bring
a voting district complaint.27 In Thornburg v. Gingles," the Court
lines may be drawn, for example, to provide for compact districts of con-
tiguous territory, or to maintain the integrity of political subdivisions.
Id.
266. The majority states that 'these criteria are important not because they are
constitutionally required-they are not .. . Id. at 2827. Justice White's dissenting
opinion states that "while district irregularities may provide strong indicia of a poten-
tial gerrymander . . . they have no bearing on whether the plan ultimately is found
to violate the Constitution." Id. at 2841 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens' dis-
senting opinion also argues that there is no constitutional requirement of compactness
or contiguity. Id. at 2843 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
267. See Grofman, supra note 1, at 1263 (noting that "permitting the construction of
districts, whose boundaries are simply not definable in commonsense terms, vitiates
the principle that representatives are to be elected from geographically defined dis-
tricts and vitiates the advantages of such districts as the basis of electoral choice").
268. Id. at 1262. The "cognizability principle" distinguishes districts created by dis-
regarding natural boundaries, local subunit boundaries (such as cities and townships),
and political subdivisions from districts that are ill-compact because they employ
natural boundaries or use sparsely populated cities as district boundaries. The latter
districts still provide its constituents with cognizability and thus, it is argued, do not
detract from their purpose. Id, at 1263.
269. North Carolina's 12th district should have been rejected on the basis of im-
proper districting, rather than using the district's odd shape as evidence to condemn
the district on racial classification grounds.
270. Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075, 1084 (1993) ("[T]he 'geographically compact
majority' and 'minority political cohesion' showings are needed to establish that the
minority has the potential to elect a representative of its own choice in some single-
adopted as its first threshold requirement for establishing a violation of
the Voting Rights Act a requirement that the minority group show it is
geographically compact.272 In United Jewish Organizations v.
Carey,273 the Court also held that a state could apportion districts to
remedy minority vote dilution provided the state employ "sound
districting principles such as compactness and population equality". '
Furthermore, as many as twenty-five states have districting requirements
relating to compactness."'
While more difficult to quantify analytically than the principle of "one
person, one vote," the notion of compactness remains simple enough to
be understood by laypersons. Recent developments provide techniques
for evaluating the relative compactness of districts and removes the in-
consistency and ad hoc manner in which compactness standards are
currently evaluated. 6 Under a compactness analysis, the appearance of
especially egregious districts like that of North Carolina's could clearly
be subject to invalidation. A compactness requirement would send a
message that districts must adhere to principles other than race without
impugning the Voting Rights Act.
6. Political Protectionism as a Factor
In addition to the compactness rationale, there was another justifica-
tion the Court could have used to reject the North Carolina reapportion-
ment plan without impairing the range of remedies available to cure
Voting Rights Act violations. The democratically-controlled North Caro-
lina legislature rejected the recommendation submitted by the Attorney
General to create a second majority-minority district in the state's south-
eastern region.2" Instead, the legislature created the twelfth district
with the goal of pitting republican candidates against each other to avoid
the loss of an incumbent democratic representative. 8 In other words,
member district."); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986) (stating that a "mi-
nority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographi-
cally compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district").
271. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
272. Id. at 50.
273. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
274. Id. at 168.
275. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 210, at 528.
276. Id. at 536 ("Recent developments in both theory and technology now make it
possible to evaluate district 'appearances' in a systematic and consistent way.").
277. Id. at 490.
278. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2842 n.10 (1993) (White, J., dissenting)
("[North Carolina's] decision not to create the more compact southern majority-minor-
ity district that was suggested . . .was more likely a result of partisan consider-
ations."); see also Grofman, supra note 1, at 1252-53 ("[T]he final Democratic plan
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the creation of North Carolina's twelfth district was the product of politi-
cal protectionism, and as such cannot justify the divergence from ordi-
nary districting considerations." Under these circumstances, the Court
correctly attacked North Carolina's districting plan.'e Unfortunately, the
Court focused on the use of race rather than the impropriety of creating
"bizarre" districts to ensure political protectionism.
Although the majority's opinion surprised many scholars, the Court's
carefully crafted the bizarre configuration of the two black majority House districts
so as to avoid negative consequences - such as pairings - for the white Democratic
incumbents.").
279. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 184 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (stating that a political gerrymander's "reliance on 'one per-
son, one vote' does not sufficiently explain or justify the discrimination the plan in-
flicted on Democratic voters as a group").
280. The Court addressed the issue of political gerrymandering in Davis. Davis
involved a suit brought by Indiana democrats who complained the use of political
gerrymanders diluted their votes. Id. at 115. In the Marian and Allen county 1982
elections, Democratic candidates received 46.6% of the votes, but only three of the 21
democratic candidates were elected. Id. A plurality of Justices concluded that "equal
protection violations [occur] only where a history of disproportionate results appeared
in conjunction with strong indicia of lack of political power and the denial of fair
representation." Id. at 139. While Davis appears to reject the proposition that the
Shaw majority could have invalidated the North Carolina district on political gerry-
mandering grounds, unlike Shaw, the Davis case included no allegation of ill-compact
districts. The combination of districts that are created by political parties in power to
achieve political gains and that violate traditional districting principles appears to be
a distinct case. The majority's argument that creating a district for the sole purpose
of electing a representative from a particular race is "altogether antithetical to our
system of representative democracy," Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827, can easily be applied
to the case of a political party candidate, especially when the political party protects
its own interests. At least one Justice would apparently subscribe to this theory. Id.
at 2844 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I believe that the Equal Protection Clause is violat-
ed when the State creates the kind of uncouth district boundaries seen in Karcher v.
Daggett, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, and this case, for the sole purpose of making it more
difficult for members of a minority group to win an election."); see also Karcher v.
Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 748 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (claiming that gerrymander-
ing violates the Equal Protection Clause only when the districting plan serves "no
purpose other than to favor one segment-whether racial, ethnic, religious, economic
or political-that may occupy a position of strength at a particular point in time, or
disadvantage a politically weak segment of the community") (emphasis added). See
generally David P. Van Knapp, Annotation, Diluting Effect of Minorities' Votes by
Adoption of Particular Election Plan, or Gerrymandering of Election District, as
Violation of Equal Protection Clause of Federal Constitution, 27 A.LR. FED. 29
(1993) (discussing federal cases pertaining to the effect of gerrymandering on minori-
ties).
decision stands consistent with a line of racial classification cases out-
side the sphere of voting. Beginning with Bakke and continuing through
Croson and Metro Broadcasting, state action designed to remedy the
social evils of past discrimination has gradually fallen from the Court's
favor." While the majority furthers an admirable goal of a colorblind
government, it naively believes that racial prejudice can be systematically
eliminated by simply wishing it so. While it remains to be seen whether
Shaw is the beginning of the end for the Voting Rights Act, the current
Court' will clearly look unfavorably towards a claim that any race-
based classification is benign.
B. Justice White's Dissenting Opinion
Justice White's dissent, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens,'s
initially focused on previously recognized constitutional claims brought
by voter-plaintiffs.' 4 Finding no previous claims to justify the majority's
holding, Justice White strongly objected to the majority's recognition of a
new cause of action.'
Justice White's analysis seemed to ignore the fact that the cause of
action in Shaw did not previously exist, and consequently fell outside
any existing "rights."' Furthermore, while the plaintiffs brought their
claim as voters, the new cause of action originates from non-voting prin-
ciples and remains only tangentially related to the act of voting. 7 The
281. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (holding
racial quotas for college admissions are subject to strict scrutiny); Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986). In striking down a policy of preferential treat-
ment of minorities concerning layoffs, the court in Wygant noted that "public employ-
ers, including public schools, also must act in accordance with a 'core purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment' which is to 'do away with all governmentally imposed
discriminations based on race.'" Id. (citations omitted).
282. The Chief Justice, as well as Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas,
form a block that has consistently rejected the use of racial classifications to achieve
a political end.
283. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting).
284. Id. (White, J., dissenting). "We have held that only two types of state voting
practices could give rise to a constitutional claim." Id. (White, J., dissenting). The
two types of practices identified by Justice White are those that result in the "direct
and outright deprivation of the right to vote" and those that have the intent or effect
of "unduly diminishing" the political strength of a group. Ld. (White, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 2838. Since neither individual nor group rights are asserted by the ma-
jority to be violated, Justice White's dissent concludes that "it is irrefutable that ap-
pellants in this proceeding likewise have failed to state a claim." Id. at 2837 (White,
J., dissenting).
286. Justice White argues "[tihere is no support for this distinction in UJO, and no
authority in the cases relied on by the Court either." Id. at 2838 (White, J., dissent-
ing). This only tends to support the majority's assertion that the cause of action is
new. See id. at 2828.
287. The right to participate in a "colorblind" electoral process, while focusing on
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thrust of the majority's argument centers on the premise that each per-
son has the right to participate in a colorblind election process that is no
different from the right to participate in a colorblind housing market or a
colorblind job market.' The dissent nevertheless engages in a lengthy
analysis of the vote dilution argument.'
Perhaps Justice White's true worry involved the potential use of this
new cause of action for attacking districts to obtain a more favorable
political climate.ss The majority, however, never addressed this pos-
sibility. As a result, the majority opinion and Justice White's dissenting
opinion attacked points in the other's argument while never directly
addressing their fundamentals. The dissent correctly notes that the white
voters in Shaw cannot make out a vote dilution claim based on the
Court's recent cases." However, the point of this argument is negli-
gible, as the majority expressly discarded vote dilution as a premise not
raised by the appellants.'s Likewise, while the majority correctly points
out that race classifications are subject to strict scrutiny under recent
Equal Protection Clause cases,' the failure to raise the possibility of
the act of voting itself, is more an indictment on the use of race as a classification.
See id. at 2827. The Court stated that "'[iif our society is to continue to progress as
a multiracial democracy, it must recognize that the automatic invocation of race ste-
reotypes retards that progress and causes continued hurt and injury'" Id. (quoting
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630-31 (1991)).
288. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2815. Justice O'Connor cites Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986), and Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977), for the proposition that the 14th Amendment requires states to sat-
isfy strict scrutiny in order to justify distinguishing citizens on the basis of race.
Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2825. Wygant was a case involving racial classifications in the
job market. See supra note 281. Arlington Hts. involved claims that municipal rezon-
ing discriminated against racial minorities in violation of the 14th Amendment
Arlington Hts., 429 U.S. at 254.
289. Shaw, 113 S. Ct at 2836 (White, J., dissenting). For Justice White "[t]he issue
is whether the classification based on race discriminates against anyone by denying
equal access to the political process." Id.
290. See Alienikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 34, at 604 (stating that voting-rights
cases "involve large numbers of interested parties who can be expected to exploit
any uncertainty in the law").
291. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2845 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating, "Today, the Court rec-
ognizes a new cause of action").
292. Id. at 2824. The Court noted that the appellants "did not claim that the Gener-
al Assembly's reapportionment plan unconstitutionally 'diluted' white voting
strength . .. ." Id.
293. See City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (stating that strict
scrutiny is necessary in evaluating race-based measures in order to "smoke out" ille-
gitimate uses of race).
potential abuse of this new cause of action tends to diminish the
opinion's persuasiveness.
Justice White contends in Part I of his dissent that a vote dilution
claim is insupportable based on the Court's previous decisions,' rely-
ing mainly on United Jewish Organizations v. Carey (UJO).' While
the facts of UJO are in most respects similar to the present case, the
majority clearly identified two important distinctions. First, as Justice
O'Connor points out in UJO, New York's plan satisfied the Voting Rights
Act in creating a majority-minority district according to "traditional
districting principles." 6 The Shaw majority opinion distinguished the
two cases, pointing out that the North Carolina plan was "on its face...
so highly irregular that it rationally could be understood only as an effort
to segregate others by race." 7
The second distinction is that the plaintiffs cause of action in Shaw
was different that the plantiffs' cause of action in UJO, which was predi-
cated on vote dilution. While the plaintiffs in UJO suffered essentially the
same injury as the plaintiffs in Shaw, they would not have been success-
ful in bringing the same cause of action. Because the majority created
a new cause of action that the plaintiffs in UJO were barred from bring-
ing, the dissents' reliance on UJO is unconvincing.
The dissent also raised a point that is often misunderstood and needs
further elaboration. While attacking the plaintiffs' claim, Justice White
raised the following argument: "[T]hough they might be dissatisfied at the
prospect of casting a vote for a losing candidate-a lot shared by many,
including a disproportionate number of minority voters-surely they
294. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2836 (White, J., dissenting). For Justice White, "the issue is
whether the classification based on race discriminates against anyone by denying
equal access to the political process." Id.
295. 430 U.S. 144 (1977). UJO involved a claim brought by members of New York's
Hasidic Jewish community. Id. at 152. The plaintiffs argued that New York's reappor-
tionment plan split the Hasidic community, which had previously comprised a whole
district, and thereby diluted the voting strength of the Jewish community in order to
satisfy § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 152-53. The New York plan created a
majority-minority district consisting of 65% non-white (black and Puerto Ricans) by
reassigning part of the Hasidic community to an adjacent district. Id. at 152. A plu-
rality of Justices held that New York's districting plan did not violate either the 14th
or 15th Amendments. Id. at 167. The opinion went on to state that while it was irre-
futable that New York deliberately used race to create the district, "its plan repre-
sented no racial slur or stigma with respect to whites or any other race, and we dis-
cern no discrimination violative of the Fourteenth Amendment nor any abridgment of
the right to vote on account of race within the meaning of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment." Id. at 165.
296. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2829.
297. Id.
298. Id. (expressly stating that the facts in UJO would not support the cause of
action recognized in Shaw).
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cannot complain of discriminatory treatment."' Undeniably, every dis-
trict contains many discreet majorities and minorities, be they race, polit-
ical affiliation, social status, or religious affiliation.' Acknowledging
this contention, it follows that, in a winner-take-all election, a given mi-
nority group bears a distinct disadvantage and will in all probability lose
the election to its majority opponent."'1 The minority voter may
faithfully cast his ballot in election after election and never manage to
elect a candidate of his or her own choosing. Although the voter may
feel wronged by the system, merely losing an election has never given
rise to a constitutional claim.' The problem arises when a political
body, such as a state legislature, attempts to "rig" the results of an elec-
tion to achieve a satisfactory political end. This was the intent in
GomiUion and many "safe" districts were created with this intent as
well.'
A safe district is one that is drawn to allow a certain group or minority
enough of a majority to ensure their ability to elect the representative of
their choice.' Courts have used safe districts to remedy violations of
section two of the Voting Rights Act and to satisfy the nonretrogression
requirements of section five.2 Where racial bloc voting takes place, as
it arguably does in North Carolina,' safe districts offer the only proven
299. Id. at 2838 (White, J., dissenting).
300. It is impossible to configure a district to maintain equal numbers of every
characteristic. First of all, there are not equal numbers of each group, and second, it
would be logistically impossible to create an equal distribution even if every group
had equal numbers.
301. Of course, this is a simplified assumption that does not take into consideration
the effectiveness of campaigning or crossover voting and is merely illustrative.
302. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 154-55 (1971) ("The mere fact that one
interest group or another concerned with the outcome of [the district's] elections has
found itself outvoted and without legislative seats of its own provides no basis for in-
voking constitutional remedies where ... there is no indication that this segment of
the population is being denied access to the political system.").
303. See Howard & Howard, supra note 2, at 1663 (stating that "safe districts vio-
late the goal of political equality by intentionally manipulating the political system to
give one group an unequal chance to influence the system's results").
304. See Yanos, supra note 16, at 1813 (defining the term "safe district").
305. Id. at 1830 ("The courts, redistricting commissions and the Department of Jus-
tice have all chosen 'safe' districting within a single-member-district system as the
preferred remedy for implementing proportional representation under section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act.); see also Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 776 (9th
Cir. 1990) ("The deliberate construction of minority controlled voting districts is ex-
actly what the Voting Rights Act authorizes."), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1028 (1991).
306. The parties in Shaw dispute the presence of pervasive racial bloc voting, but
method for allowing minority voters to elect a representative of their
own choosing.'
Conflicting ideas exist, however, concerning what the exact purpose of
a safe district should be. Most courts and commentators have assumed
that safe districts are intended to guarantee minority voters a victory at
the voting booth." However, no set of circumstances can justify state
action designed to predetermine an election result.
When a government allocates such an advantage to one group in an
election, those who cast ballots in the disadvantaged group suffer a
greater harm than merely losing the election. Essentially, their votes are
taken from them. In a system of government that holds the right to vote
more valuable than all others, even the remedial function of overcoming
the evils of social prejudice cannot justify this result."
More appropriately, "safe" districts should be viewed as a means of
creating a district in which members of the disadvantaged group are
grouped together to overcome biases or offset the effects of past dis-
crimination."' As one commentator wrote, "the ideal supermajority lev-
el is that at which a minority-supported candidate's defeat could not be
attributable to his or her race or the race of his or her supporters.""' In
other words, states should be able to use racial classifications and to
create districts where such minorities comprise a majority of the voting
population if the area has been demonstrated to be antagonistic towards
minority voting rights."' However, the idea that a district is safe in the
North Carolina's inability to elect one African-American representative from a popu-
lation that is comprised of 2096 African-American for over 100 years prior to the 1990
redistricting speaks for itself. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2843 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
307. See Shapiro, supra note 16, at 200 ("In a racially polarized polity . . . , a ra-
cial minority will be able to elect representatives only if it constitutes a controlling
majority in certain districts. Where blacks are a numerical minority, racial bloc voting
means that blacks must back either a white-supported candidate or a loser.").
308. See Abrams, supra note 2, at 470 ("[Clourts have encouraged the use of
'supermajority' districts, with at least sixty-five percent minority population, to com-
pensate for such disadvantages and virtually assure minority voters the opportunity to
elect the representative of their choice."); see also Yanos, supra note 16, at 1831-32
(stating that "safe districting proponents argue that it does not lead to proportional
representation, but rather 'proportional opportunity'").
309. See Howard & Howard, supra note 2, at 1655 (stating that "safe districting
under the Voting Rights Act denies all those not holding views that correlate with
the favored characteristic the kind of equal political opportunity they would have had
in [a neutral] political system").
310. See Guinier, supra note 204, at 1502 (explaining that remedies could be fash-
ioned "in order to provide blacks with the level of political power they would have
enjoyed but for discrimination").
311. Shapiro, supra note 16, at 201-02.
312. Accord Croson, 488 U.S. at 536 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (eradicating the effects
of past racial discrimination is a "compelling" interest).
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sense that states act to ensure the outcome of elections, leads to a situa-
tion where voting becomes "pointless" for everyone.313
In a properly created "safe" district, the population of the disadvan-
taged group should exceed the advantaged only to the extent necessary
to overcome racial barriers and discrimination. This results in an election
in which any group can influence the results, but stops short of ensuring
victory for a particular minority.31 4 While creating this type of district is
admittedly more difficult than one that guarantees an election result,
maintaining the integrity of the electoral process justifies any additional
effort.
Part II of Justice White's dissent is aimed at a loose thread in the fab-
ric of the majority's analysis: the requirement of irregularly shaped
boundaries. 1 The reason that the plaintiffs in UJO could not have suc-
cessfully brought the cause of action recognized by Shaw was that the
majority-minority district in UJO was compact.3 ' Irregularity is a neces-
sary requirement of the new cause of action, not because it is an element
of the injury identified (inability to participate in a colorblind electoral
process), but because the alternative would create chaos. If plaintiffs
could challenge compact as well as ill-compact districts under the
majority's new cause of action, virtually every district in the United
States could be challenged because, as the majority admits, "legislature
always is aware of race when it draws district lines."1 7
The requirement of compactness then becomes an administrative re-
quirement as opposed to a substantive requirement. Justice White's dis-
sent is critical of this distinction. In exposing the weakness, Justice
313. Dana R. Carstarphen, The Single Transferable Vote: Achieving the Goals of
Section 2 Without Sacrtficing the Integration Ideal, 9 YALE L & POLY REV. 405, 417
n.65 (1991).
314. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 123 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(noting that attempting to artificially create proportional representation "would create
the risk that some groups would receive an undeserved windfall of political influ-
ence").
315. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2841. "[T]he majority's explanation of its holding is related
to its simultaneous discomfort and fascination with irregularly shaped districts ....
By focusing on looks rather than impact, the majority 'immediately casts attention in
the wrong direction - toward superficialities of shape and size, rather than toward the
political realities of district composition.'" Id. (quoting R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRE-
SENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS 459 (1968)).
316. The majority stated that the facts in UJO would not have supported the allega-
tion that "the plan, on its face, was so highly irregular that it rationally could be
understood only as an effort to segregate voters by race." Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2829.
317. Id. at 2826.
White asserts in his dissent: "Given two districts drawn on similar, race-
based grounds, the one does not become more injurious than the other
simply by virtue of being snake-like, at least so far as the Constitution is
concerned and absent any evidence of differential racial impact."
318
It was unfortunate that the majority did not see fit to expand on the
irregularity element of this new claim. The point made by Justice White
in his dissent was valid, and one that the majority would have had diffi-
culty rebutting had it addressed the issue in its opinion."' The prerequi-
site that a district be irregularly shaped appears to be a necessary, but
ambiguous, administrative requirement of the majority's new cause of
action. The majority appears undaunted, however, by any such ambigu-
ity.=
Part IH of Justice White's dissent contends that, given the majority's
new cause of action and the corresponding application of strict scrutiny
to the North Carolina redistricting plan, the facts would support the
dismissal of the plaintiffs claim because the classification would satisfy
strict scrutiny." This assertion cannot be reconciled with the facts of
the case. Strict scrutiny requires that the state action be narrowly tai-
lored to satisfy a compelling state interest.' Assuming arguendo that
compliance with the Voting Rights Act constitutes a compelling state
interest, the Court's decision to remand the case to the District Court is
appropriate because there is evidence that North Carolina could have
drawn less-obscure districts.' Such a finding would dispel the notion
that North Carolina's plan was "narrowly tailored."
While Justice White's dissent raised some inconsistencies in the ma-
318. Id. at 2841.
319. While focusing on the unusual shape of the 12th district, the majority never
explained why such a district is more harmful than a district which is compact Com-
mentators, however, have speculated that the bizarre shape of districts "are inherently
divisive, calling attention to differences that have poisoned American society in the
past and that threaten to poison American society in the future." Alienikoff &
Issacharoff, supra note 34, at 613. The authors argue that shifting compact districts
in an effort to create majority-minority districts is "quite different from distorting the
'natural' shape of electoral districts to capture minority communities dispersed across
the state." Id. at 617.
320. See Alienikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 34, at 620 ("If Shaw is to have mean-
ing as a working definition of permissible boundaries in redistricting, its ambiguous
commands must be given some operational content").
321. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2842 (White, J., dissenting).
322. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166-67 (1987).
323. See Grofman, supra note 1, at 1257. Grofman states that in both North
Carolina's 12th district and Dallas' 30th congressional district, "neither district can be
fully justified in terms of voting rights concerns since alternative configurations exist
that are less grotesque and that do less violence to neighborhoods, communities of
interest, and political subunit boundaries." Id.
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jority opinion, it failed to address and attack the new cause of action on
its face. Instead, Justice White preferred to treat the plaintiffs claim as a
vote dilution action and devoted a large portion of his argument to at-
tacking this fictional claim.' In this respect, the dissent put forth an
ineffective and unpersuasive argument.
C. Justice Blackmun's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Blackmun joined Justice White's dissent. His separate, one
paragraph dissent was written to serve a single purpose: to draw atten-
tion to the irony of the Court's action. Justice Blackmun states:
[Ilt is particularly ironic that the case in which today's majority chooses to aban-
don settled law and to recognize for the first time this 'analytically distinct' consti-
tutional claim.... is a challenge by white voters to the plan under which North
Carolina has sent black representatives to Congress for the first time since Recon-
struction.'
Justice Blackmun's observation is a powerful reminder of how prevalent
and potent racial discrimination can be once it is entrenched within a
society. His assertion also comprises the most powerful and persuasive
argument for maintaining the viability of the Voting Rights Act and re-
considering the majority's new cause of action.
D. Justice Stevens' Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens, also joining Justice White's dissent, offers a three part
inquiry into whether the plaintiffs raise a valid constitutional claim.'
Question one inquires whether the Constitution requires states to adhere
to principles of compactness and contiguity when drawing electoral dis-
tricts." Both the majority and the dissents unanimously answer this
question in the negative.' While Justice Stevens and Justice White rec-
324. See supra notes 268-76 and accompanying text.
325. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2843 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
326. Id. at 2843 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
327. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
328. Id. at 2827 ("We emphasize that these criteria [compactness, contiguity, and re-
spect for political subdivisions] are important not because they are constitutionally
required-they are not."); see also id. at 2841 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that "[dis-
trict irregularities] have no bearing on whether the plan ultimately is found to violate
the Constitution"); id. at 2834 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("There is no independent
constitutional requirement of compactness or contiguity."); id. at 2849 (Souter, J., dis-
senting) ("[Wle have held that such principles [of compactness and contiguity] are
not constitutionally required.").
ognized the apparent inconsistency in the majority's argument, the likely
explanation is that the majority's new cause of action does not rely upon
the shape of an offending district to cause the injury. Instead, it merely
limits the number of claims that could be brought to those that exhibit
unusual configurations. This subtle distinction was either ignored or
dismissed by both Justice Stevens' and Justice White's dissent.
The second inquiry made by Justice Stevens concerns whether the
Equal Protection Clause prevents a state from drawing district
boundaries to aid identifiable groups in electing the representative of
their choice.' In answering this second question, Justice Stevens
looked to the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment and concluded that
a violation occurs when a majority legislates an advantage upon itself (as
the city of Tuskeegee did in Gomiflion), but no violation occurs when, a
majority legislates to aid an underrepresented minority group achieve
success at the polls."2 Justice Stevens' approach is a sensible one, and
one that this Note would adopt as the proper approach, provided that
the aid given to the underrepresented group is reserved for remedial
applications and does not reach the level of effectively "fixing" the elec-
tion results.
The majority predictably counters Justice Stevens' second response
with the anti-affirmative action language from Croson: "[E]qual protec-
tion analysis 'is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefit-
ted by a particular classification."' 2 The flaw in this reasoning is that
classifications made to aid an underrepresented minority group are dif-
ferent from classifications made to augment the power of those already
in control, and the majority errs in merging the two into the same
wrong.' The majority's rhetoric about the evils of racial classifications
and the stigma it creates simply cannot justify its conclusion in this case.
329. See supra notes 259-69 and accompanying text.
330. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2844 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
331. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated:
The difference between constitutional and unconstitutional gerrymanders has
nothing to do with whether they are based on assumptions about the groups
they affect, but whether their purpose is to enhance the power of the group
in control of the districting process at the expense of any minority group,
and thereby to strengthen the unequal distribution of electoral power.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting)
332. Id. at 2829 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494
(1989).
333. Justice Stevens stated that "[t]he duty to govern impartially is abused when a
group with power over the electoral process defines electoral boundaries solely to
enhance its own political strength at the expense of any weaker group." Id. at 2844
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens further stated that the duty to govern "is not
violated when the majority acts to facilitate the election of a member of a group that
lacks such power." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Justice Stevens final inquiry asks whether redistricting to benefit a
minority group that would otherwise be permissible should be imper-
missible because the group is defined by race.' Justice Stevens stated:
If it is permissible to draw boundaries to provide adequate representation for
rural voters, for union members, for Hasidic Jews, for Polish Americans, or for
Republicans, it necessarily follows that it is permissible to do the same thing for
members of the very minority group whose history in the United States gave birth
to the Equal Protection Clause.'
Justice Stevens describes any contrary conclusion as "perverse," and
the irony of his point is clear. Despite its emotional appeal, Justice
Stevens' final point ignores the majority's most persuasive argument:
racial classifications are odious to our society because they serve to
segregate our society into factions rather than unite it. 7 None of the
other characteristics of Justice Stevens' list operate with anywhere near
the same potential to divide our society. Finally, Justice Stevens' quota-
tion would lead one to believe that the Equal Protection Clause was
written to protect legislation benefiting the African-American race, rather
than eliminating legislation that discriminated against the African-Amer-
ican race.' Given the Court's interpretation of the Clause in Bakke,
Croson, and Shaw, "equal" does not mean fair, "equal" merely means
colorblind.
E. Justice Souter's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Souter's dissenting opinion is the only one of the four dissent-
ing opinions that addresses the majority's argument by contesting its new
cause of action rather than making a vote dilution argument.' Justice
Souter takes exception with the majority's deviation from previous
districting cases, that had, prior to Shaw, remained distinct from other
Equal Protection analysis.' "Until today, the Court has analyzed equal
protection claims involving race in electoral districting differently from
equal protection claims involving other forms of governmental con-
334. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
335. Id. at 2844-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
336. Id. at 2845 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
337. Id. at 2824-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
338. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
339. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2848 (Souter, J., dissenting). "The Court . . . does not pur-
port to disturb the law of vote dilution in any way .... Instead, the Court creates a
new 'analytically distinct' . . . cause of action. . . ." I& (Souter, J., dissenting).
340. Id. at 2845 (Souter, J., dissenting).
duct." " Justice Souter claimed that the justifications for the distinction
involved two separate considerations and that these considerations were
still valid."
First, unlike other forms of government activity, electoral districting
always calls for some decisions to be made regarding race in a constitu-
ency.3" As the other Justices have emphasized, where racial bloc voting
occurs, governments will attempt to combat the effect in order to avoid
dilution of minority voting strength. Second, other non-voting classifica-
tions that use race as an identifying characteristic involve a correspond-
ing benefit to one group at the expense of another.' Districting, on the
other hand, merely positions voters in one district instead of another
without a corresponding benefit or burden to anyone.'
Because of the absence of burden or benefit in classifying voters on
the basis of race, Justice Souter argues that a more relaxed level of scru-
tiny is appropriate for districting analysis." By identifying impermissi-
ble uses of race and their corresponding effects, he argues that the need
for strict scrutiny in cases that do not meet these criteria is unneces-
sary." "Under this approach, in the absence of an allegation of [dilu-
tion], there is no need for further scrutiny because a gerrymandering
claim cannot be proven without the element of harm."'
Justice Souter insists that the two distinct Equal Protection Clause
analyses are viable and should remain separate." While this idea lacks
the symmetry and simplicity of the majority's incorporation of the
districting equal protection analysis into the traditional Equal Protection
341. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
342. Id. at 2845-46 (Souter, J., dissenting).
343. Id. at 2826. Justice White in his dissent explained: "Because extirpating such
considerations from the districting process is unrealistic, the Court has not invalidated
all plans that consciously use race. . . ." Id. at 2835 (White, J., dissenting).
344. Id. at 2846 (Souter, J., dissenting). As examples of this assertion, Justice
Souter cites City of Richmond v. J.A. Crosen Co, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1988) (allocating
government contracts to minorities necessarily removes those contracts from non-
minority competitors) and Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283-83
(1986) (race used to supplant seniority for laying off teachers).
345. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2846 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("In redistricting, . . . the mere
placement of an individual in one district instead of another denies no one a right or
benefit provided to others.").
346. Id. at 2847-48 (Souter, J., dissenting).
347. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
348. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Of course, the new cause of action recognized by
the majority invalidates Justice Souter's logic, right or wrong. Currently, a plaintiff
does not need to establish harm to bring a claim, just the presence of impermissible
racial classifications. Id. at 2828.
349. Id. at 2848 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("There is thus no theoretical inconsistency
in having two distinct approaches to equal protection analysis, one for cases of elec-
toral districting and one for most other types of state governmental decisions.").
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Clause analysis, it is more reasonable and more just. The majority's deci-
sion will just inspire methods to mask racial considerations rather than
create discussion and compromise in this area.' By forcing such deci-
sions behind closed doors, the majority does not create a colorblind
society, it merely creates a blind one.
V. IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION
A. The Meaning of Shaw v. Reno
Due to the ambiguous nature of the Court's decision, Shaw will likely
require other judicial interpretations. This ambiguity stems from several
unanswered questions from the majority's opinion. First, there are ques-
tions as to whether the shape of North Carolina's twelfth district is in
fact the root of the plaintiff's claim or whether race-conscious districting
is the problem."I Next, courts must decide how "bizarre" a district must
be before the elements of this cause of action are met.s In addition,
courts must determine which state interests are "compelling" and which
measures are "narrowly tailored" to satisfy the test of strict scrutiny.m
350. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 210, at 578-79. This article asserted that:
[11n post-Shaw litigation challenging certain black-dominated congressional
districts in Louisiana, the Justice Department has filed a brief arguing that
'where a compact majority-minority district could be drawn, but the state
chooses to draw the district in a different, less compact way to protect an
incumbent or to give partisan advantage to one political party, the state will
be able to explain the odd shape of the district on considerations other than
race.'
Id.
351. There are statements in the Court's opinion in Shaw that support either inter-
pretation. Compare Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824 ("What appellants object to is redistrict-
ing legislation that is so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be
viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting.") (emphasis
added), and id. at 2827 (explaining that "reapportionment is one area in which ap-
pearances do matter") (emphasis added) with id. at 2832 ("race-based districting by
our state legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny"), and id. at 2830 ("[T]he very
reason that the Equal Protection Clause demands strict scrutiny of all racial classifi-
cations is because without It, a court cannot determine whether or not the discrimi-
nation truly is 'benign.'") (emphasis added).
352. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 210, at 484 ("defining the values and purposes
that might translate this impulse [to correct bizarre districts) into an articulate, jus-
tifiable set of legal principles is no easy task").
353. See Aleinhlkoff & Issacharoff, supra note 34, at 646. "It is not obvious what a
'prima facie' standard would look like [after Shaw] in the voting-rights cases." Id
Aleinkoff & Issacharoff also state that "(tlhe Court could apply strict scrutiny but still
As for the possible significance of Shaw, three general possibilities will
be presented here. First, due to the uniqueness of North Carolina's
twelfth district, the facts of Shaw may render it an obscure and unimpor-
tant case. ' Second, Shaw may be the first shot fired in the Court's ef-
fort to phase out the Voting Right Act.? Finally, Shaw may be impor-
tant for a narrow set of cases whose facts, while not exactly like those
of Shaw, are similar enough to give the Court's decision a more influen-
tial role.'
1. Shaw as an Anomaly
Several of the Justices, as well as commentators, suggested that North
Carolina's twelfth district is so unusually shaped that districts similarly
situated will be a very rare occurrence. 7 Indeed, the decision in Shaw
literally requires, as an element of its new cause of action, that the chal-
lenged district's shape have no other explanation other than racial segre-
gation of voters.' Although few districts will so clearly fall into this
category as the North Carolina district,a courts have already begun ap-
plying the holding in Shaw to districting cases.' The decision is there-
fore likely to inspire a great deal of litigation to determine the bound-
aries of the Court's decision."' While future districts will be forewarned
of Shaw's command, "Thou shall not gerrymander," majority-minority dis-
validate run-of-the-mill districting plans if it could identify a new, rather easily estab-
lished, compelling state interest for the use of race in state districting decisions. For
instance, state actors could cite the 'diversity' interest articulated by Justice Powell in
Bakke." Id. at 608.
354. See infra notes 358-63 and accompanying text.
355. See infta notes 364-68 and accompanying text.
356. See infra notes 369-75 and accompanying text.
357. See, e.g., Shaw, 113 S. Ct at 2848 (Souter, J., dissenting). The court stated:
[I]t may be that the terms for pleading this cause of action will be met so
rarely that this case will wind up an aberration. The shape of the district at
issue in this case is indeed so bizarre that few other examples are every
likely to carry the unequivocal implication of impermissible use of race that
the Court finds here.
Id.; see also Grofman, supra note 1, at 1263 ("I view the 12th Congressional District in
North Carolina as a particularly unusual (and virtually unique) case.").
358. Shaw, 113 S. Ct at 2832.
359. In fact, North Carolina's 12th district had the distinction of being labeled the
*least compact congressional district in the country." Pildes & Niemi, supra note 210,
at 587.
360. See Jeffers v. Tucker, 847 F. Supp. 655, 662 (E.D. Ark. 1994) ("While they are
nowhere nearly so unusual in shape as the 1-85 district at issue in Shaw, the Senate
districts are anything but compact").
361. See David Savage, High Court Rules Against 'Racial Gerrymandering' Law,
LA. TIMES, June 29, 1993, at Al ("Experts in voting-rights law said the ruling is likely
to trigger lawsuits nationwide that challenge 'majority-minority' districts.").
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tricts that were drawn after the 1990 Census are also in danger of being
challenged. 2 Given the current disposition of the Court towards racial
classifications, however, it is unlikely that Shaw will be a forgotten case
in the near future.
2. The Beginning of the End of the Voting Rights Act
Understandably, proponents of the Voting Rights Act are nervously
awaiting the scope of the decision in Shaw to unfold.' If Shaw may be
interpreted as having incorporated voting practices and principles into
the equal protection analysis of non-voting cases such as City of Rich-
mond v. J.A. Croson Co.,'m the availability of remedies for violations of
the Voting Rights Act may be severely restricted.' Racial classifications
362. One source estimates that nationwide, 26 majority-minority districts have been
created since the 1990 Census. Lynne Duke, Advocates Say Justices Muddy Voting
Rights, THE WASH. PosT, June 30, 1993, at A8.
363. Courts have already interpreted Shaw's holding as a bar to creating voting dis-
tricts using race. See Hines v. Mayor of Ahoskie, 998 F.2d 1266, 1274 (4th Cir. 1993)
(citing Shaw, the court held that "a legislature may not devise a districting plan sole-
ly for the purpose of segregating citizens into separate voting districts on the basis
of race without sufficient justification"); Houston v. Lafayette County, 841 F. Supp.
751, 765 (N.D. Miss. 1993) (citing Shaw, the court declared: "By no means was the
[Voting Rights Act] enacted to ensure the success of black or other minority candi-
dates by carving the political terrain into irregularly and artificially shaped designs
and patterns that result in the deliberate creation of safe majority minority districts
reserved exclusively for minority candidates to represent"). But see Marylanders For
Fair Representation v. Schaefer, 849 F. Supp. 1022, 1053 (D. Md. 1994) (stating that
"although a state can-and at times must-place great weight on race when redis-
tricting, it may not do so to the exclusion of all traditional nonracial districting prin-
ciples"). Alienlkoff & Issacharoff, supra note 34, at 639, stated:
If the Court seems to have neglected the implications of its reasoning, it may
be because It had different game in sight: the Voting Rights Act itself. Shaw
fairly invites a constitutional reexamination of section 2 of the Act. Should
any court decide that the broad remedial purposes of the Act compel
districting akin to North Carolina's,... the question will be directly put
whether such a justification is sufficient, under strict scrutiny analysis, to
justify the overt use of race as the dispositive factor in the districting deci-
sion.
Id.
364. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
365. Because the usual remedy to a Voting Rights Act violation is to create a safe
district, and because creating a safe district by definition employs racial classifica-
tions, eliminating this remedy would present legislators with few other effective alter-
natives. See Abrams, supra note 2, at 520 (describing safe districts as the "approach
are an essential element to cure violations for obvious reasons. If reme-
dies are eliminated, the Act becomes a useless tool." While a point
may come where the Voting Rights Act is no longer needed to protect
and ensure minority representation, that time has not yet arrived. 7
3. Shaw as a Messenger to Future District-makers
The most probable reading of Shaw is that the Supreme Court is head-
ing the country towards a race-neutral society and flagrant uses of race
will no longer be tolerated. The Court, however, will probably continue
to permit the use of race as one factor among many." This interpre-
tation is a logical assumption from the text of the opinion. First, if the
Court had intended to completely eliminate all use of race from congres-
sional districting, it could have clearly stated so in the opinion.' In-
stead, the Court leaves "open" the question of whether the creation of
majority-minority districts will always give rise to the cause of action
announced in the decision.' ° This assumption is supported by the spe-
cial attention given by the majority to the unusual shape of the North
Carolina district." Certainly, as Justice White notes, a district drawn on
that most courts currently favor" and identifying the process as "within a category of
race conscious remedies that the framers of the Voting Rights Act explicitly anticipat-
ed").
366. It is difficult to hypothesize an effective remedial measure to a proven vote
dilution claim that does not use racial classifications of any kind.
367. See Grofman, supra note 1, at 1260-61 (stating that he does "not believe that
the Act is, on balance, neither no longer needed nor actually counterproductive for
minorities").
368. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265. In Bakke, the Court allowed the university to con-
sider the "diversity" interest in selecting applicants for its medical school, while pro-
hibiting the allocation of a percentage of openings to minority applicants. Id. at 320.
369. What Shaw does not say is the most convincing evidence that all racial consid-
erations have not been removed from districting decisions. The North Carolina plan is
obviously the result of race-conscious districting, and the state defendants concede as
much in their brief. State Appellee's Supplemental Brief at 6, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.
Ct. 2816 (1993) (No. 92-357) (arguing that race-conscious redistricting does not violate
the Voting Rights Act). If the Court's intent was to eliminate all forms of racial clas-
sifications, it could easily have said so without relying on the bizarre shape of the
district. Hence, there is a strong argument that the Court's intention was to eliminate
obvious racial classifications while retaining the use of classifications as a factor to
be considered along with other factors. See Allenikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 34,
at 608-10.
370. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2828 ("[W]e express no view as to whether 'the intentional
creation of majority-minority districts, without more' always gives rise to an equal
protection claim.").
371. This assertion is also supported by the fact that the Court distinguished, rather
than overruled, United Jewish Organizations. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2829-30. UJO was
clearly an example of a district which was drawn using racial classifications to ac-
complish a race oriented result. Id. at 2839 (White, J., dissenting) ("Nor was it ever
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race-based grounds "does not become more injurious.., simply by vir-
tue of being snake-like, at least so far as the Constitution is con-
cerned."'
. Another point suggesting that Shaw may not totally foreclose the use
of race from future districting plans is the majority's choice to create a
new cause of action and remand the case rather than striking down the
district itself." The state action was admittedly a conscious use of
race, and the Court could have applied strict scrutiny itself to strike
down the legislation. The Court's willingness to remand the case inti-
mates that it is not yet willing to take a hard line stance on the elimina-
tion of all race-based districting.'
Vl. CONCLUSION
The right of an individual to cast a ballot for the representative of his
or her choice is vital to the theory of government that this nation has
adopted. The Court has held that the right to vote is "[u]ndoubtedly... a
fundamental matter in a free and democratic society. "n 5 This right has
been held to be paramount to all other rights in its importance to a dem-
ocratic society." All other rights are derived from the ability to be rep-
resented in one's government.7 While the right to vote is of vital im-
portance to all citizens, this right is especially critical for those groups
who wield little political power and for those who are perpetually under-
represented in the government. Unfortunately, these are the very same
groups who have historically been denied an equal opportunity to cast
their ballots due to discriminatory practices.n'
in doubt that 'the state deliberately used race in a purposeful manner.'") (quoting
United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165).
372. Id. at 2841 (White, J., dissenting).
373. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832.
374. This also opens up the possibility for an expansive interpretation of "narrowly
tailored" and "compelling state interest" in the voting rights application. Id.
375. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964).
376. See, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964). In Wesberry, the Court
stated: "No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in
the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must
live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is under-
mined." Id.
377. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562 (stating that "the right to exercise the franchise
in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political
rights").
378. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 69-70 (1986) (assuming that "'the extent
The Supreme Court's decision in Shaw v. Reno is flawed in three re-
spects. First, the Court failed to acknowledge that, under certain excep-
tional circumstances, discriminatory voting practices can only be reme-
died by the type of legislation prohibited by the Court's decision.'
North Carolina, for example, has a history of maintaining practices which
have had the effect of abridging minority voting rights, as evidenced by
its "covered" classification under section five of the Voting Rights Act.'
A rule requiring a colorblind electoral process would cripple a state
legislature's ability to protect minority representation when racial bloc
voting occurs. Without such legislation, North Carolina, for example, has
produced a dismal record for electing minority representation.'
Second, the Court's decision gives state lawmakers and lower courts
little guidance in determining when a district is so irregularly shaped as
to subject the state to a similar claim. The majority states that "reappor-
tionment is one area in which appearances do matter,"' but applying
this vague, subjective standard will certainly result in confusion and
litigation. Finally, the Court's decision limits a state's ability to comply
with the Voting Rights Act and will lead to conflict and even greater con-
fusion since compliance with the Act can only be achieved by violating
the holding in Shaw.'
to which members of the minority group . . . bear the effects of discrimination in
such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to partici-
pate effectively in the political process' ... is a factor which may be probative of
unequal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect representa-
tives")(citations omitted).
379. See Shapiro, supra note 16, at 201. "The courts have repeatedly held that the
lower levels of minority registration and turnout are attributable to past discrimina-
tion. Consequently, minority control of districts requires a 'supermajorty' - more than
a simple population majority." Id, see also Chili, supra note 71, at 673 (stating that
the "elimination of discrimination against the voting rights of minorities is the highest
constitutional imperative and... affirmative racial gerrymandering to achieve this
goal is legally compelled").
380. See supra note 127.
381. Even though the population of North Carolina is approximately 2096 African-
American, prior to 1992, no African-American had ever been elected to Congress from
North Carolina. See Brief for Appellant at 17 n.17, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816
(1993) (No. 92-357).
382. Shaw, 113 S. Ct at 2827.
383. The situation in Shaw Is a perfect example. North Carolina has an African-
American population of approximately 2096. Id. at 220. Of the 11 districts (prior to
redistricting), only one congressional representative was African-American, or 996. For
this reason, the Justice Department, acting through the Attorney General, rejected
North Carolina's original redistricting plan and required that North Carolina create a
majority-minority district with the 12th district. Herein lies the dilemma: If North Car-
olina does not create a district comprised of a majority of African-Americans, it will
violate the nonretrogresslon principle of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, as interpreted
by the Supreme Court in Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976), because the
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The Court would be better served if a compactness standard was de-
veloped by which districts could be judged.' Districts which signifi-
cantly differed from this standard would be presumed invalid absent a
showing of necessity.' A compactness standard would also ensure eas-
ily identifiable districts that facilitate other voting activities such as cam-
paigning and organization. While the application of such standards would
not eliminate the possibility for districting along racial lines, compact
districts would alleviate some of the social harms identified by the Court
in Shaw.'
Second, the Court should explicitly recognize the use of racial classi-
fications in the remedial setting. Racial classifications should be limited
to cases where discrimination has led to a long-term negative effect on
minority opportunity. Such classifications should be designed to over-
come the prejudicial effect, but stop short of providing groups with fixed
results.
Finally this Note advocates Justice Stevens' view that the use of gerry-
manders to achieve political protectionism violates the Equal Protection
Clause to the same extent as a racial gerrymander. 7 The shape of
North Carolina's twelfth district is allegedly the consequence of such
protectionism by the democratically-controlled General Assembly.'
This assertion, if true, ostensibly presents a more valid reason for dis-
percentage of African-American representatives would drop from 9% to 8% (1 out of
12). On the other hand, if North Carolina intentionally created a majority-minority
district, it violates the Court's mandate in Shaw that race cannot be used as the
primary tool for shaping districts. Id at 2825. The conflict between the holding in
Shaw and the need for classifications based on race to remedy Voting Rights Act
violations has already been addressed by at least one court. See Jeffers v. Tucker,
847 F. Supp. 655, 670 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (describing the situation as a "catch 22").
384. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 210, at 587 (arguing that "quantitative measures
of compactness provide the most secure starting points for defining 'bizarre' dis-
tricts").
385. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2825. The standard could account for natural boundaries as
well as political subdivisions, thereby reducing the likelihood that districts have been
gerrymandered for political gain.
386. Compact districts are less likely to send a message to elected officials that
their primary obligation is to serve that part of their constituency for which their dis-
trict was intentionally created. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827. Likewise, the majority's fear
that racial gerrymandering "may balkanize us into competing racial factions" is elimi-
nated where districts are created by adhering to fundamental districting principles. Id.
at 2832.
387. See supra note 332.
388. See supra notes 277-80 and accompanying text.
qualifying the district than the use of race to aid a disadvantaged political
group. Therefore, the Court should have announced a principle for invali-
dating "uncouth" districts where political protectionism is the cause, and
it should have passed on the racial classification issue.
Viewing the two concepts at issue here (minority voting jurisprudence
and governmental race-based classifications) as parallel and independent
analyses, the Shaw decision is both surprising and predictable. The
Court's decisions since the enactment of the Voting Rights Act have gen-
erally favored the protection of minority voting rights. The Court applies
a broad interpretation of the Act in order to give effect to the intent of
Congress as well as the Act's plain language.
On the other hand, the line of cases involving state action, that draws
classifications of its citizens on the basis of race have been struck down
frequently by the Court in the last two decades.' The importance of
the Shaw decision is that it indicates the Court is no longer willing to
treat these concepts as two parallel entities, but rather two lines that are
rapidly converging. Future legislators must now heed Shaw's warning:
overt racial classifications in the voting arena will be treated with the
same suspicion as state action pertaining to non-voting matters.
MICHAEL J. MOFFAT
389. See supra notes 157-83 and accompanying text.
